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The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA, or the 
Act), enacted in 1975 as the Education of All Handicapped Children 
Act (EAHCA),1 was widely praised as landmark civil rights 
legislation providing equality in educational opportunity to children 
with disabilities.2  For decades preceding the law’s passage, school 
districts routinely denied children with disabilities an adequate 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975). 
 2. Under the IDEA, and for purposes of this Article, a ‘‘child with a disability’’ is 
defined as a child ‘‘(i) with intellectual disabilities, hearing impairments (including 
deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), 
serious emotional disturbance, . . . orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain 
injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and (ii) who, by 
reason thereof, needs special education and related services.’’ 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) 
(2012); see Debra Chopp, School Districts and Families Under the IDEA: 
Collaborative in Theory, Adversarial in Fact, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 
423, 426--29 (2012) (discussing the history behind the enactment of the EAHCA). 
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education.3  They provided no educational assistance or 
accommodations to children in school, ‘‘warehoused’’ children in 
institutions thereby segregating them from their non-disabled peers, 
or excluded them from school altogether.4 
In the years following the U.S. Supreme Court’s historic 1954 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education,5 individual and class action 
lawsuits across the country challenged the exclusion of students with 
disabilities from school on equal protection and other grounds.6  Two 
seminal federal district court decisions, Pennsylvania Ass’n for 
Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania and Mills v. Board of Education, 
significantly transformed the education landscape by granting 
children with disabilities access to an adequate, publicly supported 
education, and by instituting due process and procedural protections 
for parents and children.7  Plaintiffs in these cases successfully argued 
for extension of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Brown to school-
age children with disabilities who were denied proper educational 
programs and services, specifically that ‘‘separate but equal’’ is 
‘‘inherently unequal’’ and that education ‘‘is a right which must be 
made available to all on equal terms.’’8  The end result was the 
promulgation of the Education of All Handicapped Children Act, 
now known as the IDEA. 
Nearly forty years later, tremendous progress has been made both 
in educating children with disabilities and in safeguarding their right 
to an appropriate education.9  Yet, despite the myriad of benefits 
stemming from its aim to create equality in educational opportunity 
                                                                                                                 
 3. See S. REP. NO. 104-275, at 6 (1996) (stating that prior to the enactment of the 
EAHCA, approximately one million children were excluded from attending public 
schools and four million children did not receive any educational services); see also 
20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (2012) (noting that ‘‘the educational needs of millions of 
children’’ were not being met). 
 4. See S. REP. NO. 104-275 (1996). 
 5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 6. See, e.g., Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 
1258 (E.D. Pa. 1971); see also Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.C. Cir. 
1972) (holding that the Washington, D.C. public school system cannot exclude 
children with disabilities from regular education programs unless they are provided 
with adequate alternative services and due process protections); Pa. Ass’n for 
Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 302--03 (E.D. Pa. 1972) 
(enjoining the state from denying children with disabilities access to a free and 
appropriate program of education). 
 7. See supra note 6. 
 8. See, e.g., Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 874--75 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 
483, 493 (1954)). 
 9. See generally H.R. Con. Res. 329, 111th Cong. (2010) (enumerating the 
successes of the IDEA). 
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for children with disabilities, the IDEA has inadvertently advanced 
inequality on the ground of socioeconomic status.10   Children living in 
poverty have higher rates of disability11 and poorer educational 
outcomes than their middle and upper class peers.12  While the IDEA 
provides a detailed framework of special education rights for parents 
and their children with disabilities,13 low-income parents’ ability to 
enforce those rights successfully is, at best, a challenge and, at worst, 
an impossible feat.14  Adding insult to injury, on the occasions that 
parents succeed in their enforcement efforts, remedies available 
under the IDEA often do not compensate low-income children 
adequately for the harms that occurred and potential lifelong 
consequences that ensue.15  The failure to properly educate children 
with disabilities results in dramatic costs not only to the children 
affected and their families, but also to society.16 
                                                                                                                 
 10. This Article focuses on inequality under the IDEA stemming from socio-
economic status only.  For more information on race-based inequalities under the 
IDEA, see, e.g., N.J. COUNCIL ON DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, STILL SEPARATE 
AND UNEQUAL: THE EDUCATION OF CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES IN NEW JERSEY 
18--20 (2004), available at http://www.edlawcenter.org/assets/files/pdfs/issues-special-
education/Still_Separate_and_Unequal.pdf (discussing, in part, the 
overrepresentation of minority students in segregated special education settings); 
Carla O’Connor & Sonia D. Fernandez, Race, Class, and Disproportionality: 
Reevaluating the Relationship Between Poverty and Special Education Placement, 
35 EDUC. RESEARCHER 6 (2006) (arguing that school culture and organization place 
minority youth at risk for special education placement by perceiving them as 
academically and behaviorally deficient). 
 11. See MARY WAGNER ET AL., THE CHILDREN WE SERVE: THE DEMOGRAPHIC 
CHARACTERISTICS OF ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL STUDENTS WITH 
DISABILITIES AND THEIR HOUSEHOLDS 47 (2002), available at http://www.seels.net/ 
designdocs/SEELS_Children_We_Serve_Report.pdf; see also Patricia A. Massey & 
Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Disability Matters: Toward a Law School Clinical Model for 
Serving Youth with Special Education Needs, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 271, 281 (2005) 
(noting that low-income families are fifty percent more likely to have a child with a 
disability than higher income families). 
 12. See generally Patrice L. Engle & Maureen M. Black, The Effect of Poverty on 
Child Development and Educational Outcomes, 1136 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 243 
(2008); see also infra Part I.A (discussing the links among socioeconomic status, child 
development and educational outcomes). 
 13. See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400--1482 (2012). 
 14. This statement is based on the author’s personal experience representing low-
income parents of children with disabilities in special education matters. 
 15. See generally infra Part I. 
 16. See HARRY J. HOLZER ET AL., THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF POVERTY IN THE 
UNITED STATES: SUBSEQUENT EFFECTS OF CHILDREN GROWING UP POOR 1 (2007), 
available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2007/01/pdf/ 
poverty_report.pdf (estimating that child and youth poverty cost the country $500 
billion per year in lower economic output, increased health costs, and greater 
criminal justice costs); see also HARRY J. HOLZER, PENNY WISE, POUND FOOLISH: 
WHY TACKLING CHILD POVERTY DURING THE GREAT RECESSION MAKES ECONOMIC 
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The Third Circuit, once considered a progressive and favorable 
bastion for parents and children in the special education arena,17 more 
recently has joined the ‘‘pro-school’’ movement,18 eroding the special 
                                                                                                                 
SENSE 4 (2010), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
issues/2010/09/pdf/hit_childpoverty.pdf; LYNN A. KAROLY, ET AL., EARLY 
CHILDHOOD INTERVENTIONS: PROVEN RESULTS, FUTURE PROMISE, at xxv (2005), 
available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_ 
MG341.pdf (finding a rate of return on investment of $1.26 to $17.07 for every dollar 
spent on early childhood intervention, with the greatest cost-benefit ratios associated 
with programs that engage in longer-term follow-up); Engle & Black, supra, note 12, 
at 244 (noting that low-income students are at higher risk of not graduating from high 
school, resulting in a sixteen percent reduction in earnings from 1975--2005); Michael 
Lipkin, Evaluating Universal Preschool, CHI. TONIGHT (Mar. 19, 2013), 
http://chicagotonight.wttw.com/2013/03/19/evaluating-universal-preschool (quoting 
Nobel Prize winning economist, James Heckman, stating that children who 
participated in the Perry Preschool Project had a rate of return on investment of ‘‘7 to 
10 percent per annum for each dollar invested,’’  beating the stock market). 
 17. The Third Circuit is the only federal court of appeals to use the ‘‘meaningful 
benefit standard’’ exclusively in defining a free and appropriate public education, and 
the only one that requires a student’s Individualized Education Program, the vehicle 
for delivering an appropriate education to a student with a disability, to provide 
significant learning. See Ronald D. Wenkart, The Rowley Standard: A Circuit by 
Circuit Review of How Rowley Has Been Interpreted, 247 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 1, 
17 (2009); see also Perry A. Zirkel, Compensatory Education Under the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act: The Third Circuit’s Partially Mis-Leading Position, 
110 PENN ST. L. REV. 879, 881 n.18 (2006).  Additionally, for many years the Third 
Circuit was among the minority of courts that authorized monetary damages as a 
viable remedy for IDEA violations through § 1983 enforcement of the IDEA.  The 
Circuit was also among the few venues that left open the possibility of obtaining 
monetary damages directly under the IDEA. See, e.g., Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. 
N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 252--53 (3d Cir. 1999) (affirming the right to bring 
claims for monetary damages in special education matters under section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act, the IDEA, and § 1983); W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 494 (3d Cir. 
1995) (holding monetary damages are available in special education matters brought 
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the IDEA, and § 1983). But see A.W. v. 
Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 802 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding Congress did not 
intend to make § 1983 available to remedy violations of the IDEA and section 504); 
Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 827 F. Supp. 2d 409, 424--25 (E.D. Pa. 
2011) (on remand) (holding that compensatory damages are not available under the 
IDEA). 
 18. See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 300 
(2006) (holding that expert fees are not recoverable costs for prevailing parents under 
the IDEA’s fee-shifting provision); see also Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 
U.S. 49, 62 (2005) (holding that under the IDEA, the burden of proof in an 
administrative hearing challenging an IEP is not automatically on the school district, 
but on the party seeking relief); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Judiciary’s Now-Limited 
Role in Special Education, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE 
JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 121, 125 (Joshua M. Dunn & Martin R. 
West eds., 2009) (opining that the Schaffer and Arlington decisions ‘‘are part of a 
‘pro-school’ trend’’); Terry Jean Seligmann & Perry A. Zirkel, Compensatory 
Education for IDEA Violations: The Silly Putty of Remedies?, 45 URB. LAW. 281, 
604 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. 41 
education rights of those living in poverty.  Nowhere is this more 
evident than in the Third Circuit’s changed approach to the remedial 
framework afforded to impoverished parents and their children with 
disabilities who wrongfully have been denied essential special 
education programming and services for lengthy periods of time.  This 
Article proposes that courts’ misreading and misapplication of the 
IDEA’s 2004 statute of limitations and overly restrictive 
interpretation of its exceptions have whittled away the already limited 
remedies available for children with disabilities without financial 
means, depriving them of adequate recourse.  These are many of the 
same children who have the greatest need for proper special 
education services, based on demographics and research evidencing 
links between poverty, child development, disability, and educational 
outcomes.19  Approximately two-thirds of children with disabilities 
found eligible for special education across the country live in 
households earning less than $50,000, and nearly one-half of those 
families have incomes falling at or below the federal poverty line.20 
This Article begins with a summary of research findings regarding 
the intersection of poverty, disability, and educational outcomes.  
Data specific to Newark, New Jersey, where this author works, is 
cited, at times, to provide context.  Part II provides a brief overview 
of the remedies accessible under the IDEA and focuses in particular 
on the availability of the remedial scheme to families with limited 
financial resources in the Third Circuit.  Part III explores the 
language of the IDEA’s 2004 statute of limitations provision and 
exceptions, and analyzes the Third Circuit’s interpretation and 
application of these provisions in recent compensatory education21 
cases.  Part IV presents two case studies illustrating the chilling effects 
of these decisions on the ability of parents without means and their 
                                                                                                                 
295 (2013) (noting ‘‘what has been largely a constricting trend in interpretation of the 
IDEA,’’ with limited exceptions). 
 19. See generally infra Part I. 
 20. See WAGNER ET AL., supra, note 11, at 29. 
 21. ‘‘Compensatory education’’ is defined as a remedy that may be awarded to a 
child with a disability who wrongfully has been denied appropriate special education 
and related services. See Lester H. ex rel. Octavia P. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 873 (3d 
Cir. 1990).  It is designed to redress prior denials of a FAPE by helping IDEA-
eligible children with disabilities recoup educational progress lost due to a school 
district’s delay in offering or failure to provide proper educational programming and 
services. See id.  The award may take the form of additional programs and services 
beyond the eligible child’s entitlement to an appropriate education. See id.; see also 
infra Part III. 
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children to obtain necessary compensatory special education22 and 
related services.23  Part V concludes with a proposal for legislative 
action in the form of an explicit enumeration of compensatory 
education as a remedy and creation of a separate statute of limitations 
for compensatory education matters consistent with legislative intent 
and the Third Circuit’s prior broad remedial approach.  The proposal 
aims to rectify the impact of inequality based on socioeconomic status 
currently in the IDEA’s remedial scheme. 
I.  IDENTIFYING THE AFFECTED POPULATION: THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS, DISABILITY, 
AND EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES 
Understanding the data on the interrelationship of socioeconomic 
status, disability, and educational outcomes is critical to forming an 
accurate picture of the potential numbers of young people with 
disabilities poorly served by the IDEA’s inferior remedial scheme.  
While research abounds on the links between poverty and education, 
poverty and disability, and disability and education, few studies have 
examined the intersection of all three factors simultaneously.  The 
interrelationship may be extrapolated, however, by examining the bi-
factor associations in tandem.  Each of these associations is discussed 
in turn below.  Together, they paint a bleak portrait of the lives and 
futures of many children. 
Poverty in the United States has increased in recent years-----a likely 
consequence of the 2007 economic downturn.24  In 2010, 22% of 
children between the ages of 0--17 lived in poverty (defined as having 
an annual income of $22,113 for a family of four).25  The rate grew by 
5% since 2006, when 17% lived in poverty.26  Significantly, nearly 
                                                                                                                 
 22. ‘‘Special education’’ is defined as ‘‘specially designed instruction . . . to meet 
the unique needs of a child with a disability’’ and provided at no cost to parents. 20 
U.S.C. § 1401(29) (2012). 
 23. ‘‘Related services’’ are ‘‘developmental, corrective, and other supportive 
services[,] including speech-language pathology[,] . . . physical and occupational 
therapy, . . . [and] social work services . . . as may be required to assist a child with a 
disability from special education.’’ § 1401(26)(A). 
 24. See ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, 2011 KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK 12 (2011), 
available at http://www.aecf.org/~/media/Pubs/Initiatives/kids%20count/123/2011kids 
countdataBook/2011kcdb_final.pdf [hereinafter 2011 KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK]. 
 25. See FORUM ON CHILD AND FAMILY STATISTICS, AMERICA’S CHILDREN IN 
BRIEF: KEY NATIONAL INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING 6 (2012), available at 
http://www.childstats.gov/pdf/ac2012/ac_12.pdf. 
 26. See id. The child poverty rate continued to grow thereafter to twenty-three 
percent in 2011. See ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., 2013 KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK 7 
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one-half of these children lived in extreme poverty in households with 
incomes at or below 50% of the federal poverty level, defined in 2010 
as a yearly household income of $11,057 for a family of four.27 
Great inequalities exist in the distribution of child poverty based 
on race and ethnicity.  Of the children living in poverty in 2010, 39% 
were African-American non-Hispanic, 35% were Hispanic, and 12% 
were white.28  These racial and ethnic differences are not surprising in 
light of 2009 data showing that the median wealth of white 
households was twenty times greater than that of African-American 
households and eighteen times greater than that of Latino 
households.29  Children in poverty are more likely to live in single-
parent households as well.30 
The numbers are even more sobering in areas with high 
concentrations of poverty.  For example, 18% of all New Jersey 
children lived at or below the federal poverty level in 2011, defined as 
an annual household income of $22,350 for a family of four.31  That 
same year, approximately 50% of children under the age of five 
(more than 13,000 children) in the city of Newark lived in households 
with incomes at or below the federal poverty level.32  More than 6500 
children in Newark lived in extreme poverty, with household incomes 
less than or equal to 50% of the federal poverty level.33 
The location of a family’s residence further influences a parent’s 
ability to provide for basic needs due to cost of living differentials 
across the country.  To illustrate, a 2008 study by the Legal Services of 
New Jersey Poverty Research Institute found that for many New 
Jersey residents, including those residing in Newark, the ‘‘real cost of 
living’’ was nearly three times the federal poverty line and the 
                                                                                                                 
(2013), available at http://datacenter.kidscount.org/files/2013KIDSCOUNTData 
Book.pdf [hereinafter 2013 KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK]. 
 27. See FORUM ON CHILD AND FAMILY STATISTICS, supra note 25, at 6. 
 28. See id. (clarifying that these percentages refer to respondents who indicated 
only one racial identity, thus those who identified with more than one racial identity 
are not accounted for in the percentages). 
 29. See Rakesh Kochhar et al., Wealth Gaps Rise to Record Highs Between 
Whites, Blacks, Hispanics, PEW RES. SOC. & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS (July 26, 2011), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/07/26/wealth-gaps-rise-to-record-highs-
between-whites-blacks-hispanics. 
 30. See Jonathan Bradshaw, Poor Children, 17 CHILD. & SOC’Y 162, 170 (2003) 
(finding 44% of poor children live in single-parent households and 55% of children in 
single-parent households are poor). 
 31. See ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN OF N.J., NEWARK KIDS COUNT 2012--2013, at 
11 (2013), available at http://www.acnj.org/admin.asp?uri=2081&action=15&di=2386 
&ext=pdf&view=yes. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See id. 
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minimum wage.34  According to the 2013 Economic Policy Institute’s 
Family Budget Calculator, which was created to estimate the cost of 
‘‘getting by,’’ a family of four (two parents with two children) residing 
in Newark requires an annual income of $80,568 to ‘‘secure a basic, 
yet modest, standard of living.’’35   This requirement is a far cry from 
the 2013 federal poverty level of $23,550 for a family of four.36 
Sadly, these numbers likely do not offer a full view of the 
widespread economic and material hardship in the United States.  
The U.S. Census Bureau has been accused of ‘‘undercounting’’ people 
who live in poverty, due in part to an outdated federal definition of 
the term.37  In reality, those living between 100--200% of the federal 
poverty level also experience economic and material hardship and 
cannot meet basic family needs for food, shelter, healthcare, and 
                                                                                                                 
 34. See DIANA M. PEARCE, THE REAL COST OF LIVING IN 2008: THE SELF-
SUFFICIENCY STANDARD FOR NEW JERSEY 7--12 (2008), available at 
http://www.selfsufficiencystandard.org/docs/New%20Jersey%202008.pdf (using real-
world assumptions to measure the real cost of living, and defining the real cost of 
living as the income needed for a family with a certain composition living in a certain 
location to adequately meet their basic needs without public or private assistance). 
 35. See Family Budget Calculator, ECON. POL’Y INST., http://www.epi.org/ 
resources/budget (last visited Dec. 18, 2013); see also Beyond the Poverty Line: The 
High Cost of ‘Getting By’ in New Jersey, N.J. STAR LEDGER (July 21, 2013), 
http://blog.nj.com/perspective/2013/07/the_high_cost_of_getting_by_in.html (citing 
the Economic Policy Institute’s $80,000 estimate of the cost of ‘‘getting by’’ for a 
family of four in New Jersey, and defining ‘‘getting by’’ as having enough income to 
secure a basic, modest, standard of living in the community, including the costs of 
basic needs such as housing, child care, food, transportation, and taxes, without 
saving any money). 
 36. 2013 Federal Poverty Guidelines, FAMILIES USA, http://www.familiesusa.org/ 
resources/tools-for-advocates/guides/federal-poverty-guidelines.html (last visited 
Dec. 18, 2013). 
 37. See 2011 KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK, supra note 24, at 11 (‘‘Low income 
families are defined as those with incomes below 200% of the federal poverty 
level.’’); see also ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, 2009 KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK 13 
(2009), available at 
http://www.aecf.org/~/media/Pubs/Other/123/2009KIDSCOUNTData 
Book/AEC186_2009_KCDB_FINAL%2072.pdf (explaining that when the poverty 
measure was introduced in the 1960s, it was defined as three times the annual cost of 
food, which was considered to represent 33% of a household budget).  Today, food 
expenses account for only 10--20% of a household budget and the formula for setting 
the poverty rate does not include expenses for other family needs such as child care, 
transportation, and health insurance. Id.; see Bernard P. Dreyer, To Create a Better 
World for Children and Families: The Case for Ending Childhood Poverty, 13 
ACADEMIC PEDIATRICS 83, 83--84 (2013), available at docs.cmhnetwork.org/ 
download.php?id=539 (identifying failure to account for changes in expense rates and 
the effects of regional variations on the cost of living as two major weaknesses in U.S. 
measures of poverty). 
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childcare, among other expenses.38  Researchers and economic 
analysts have labeled families with incomes at or below 200% of the 
federal poverty level as ‘‘low-income’’ as opposed to poor.39  When 
low-income families are included in the equation, a shocking 76% of 
children under the age of five lived in low-income Newark households 
in 2011.40  Across the country that same year, over 32 million children 
lived in low-income households (at or below 200% of the federal 
poverty level, defined as $45,622 for a family of four), comprising 
45% of all U.S. children.41 
A. The Links Between Socioeconomic Status, Child 
Development, and Educational Outcomes 
Poverty is not only an issue of economics.  Extensive research has 
found that children raised in low-income families are less likely to 
achieve success; in fact, the greater their exposure to economic 
hardship, the greater their risk of failure.42  Studies have identified 
links between poverty and adverse outcomes for children in 
numerous areas, including: physical health; mental, emotional, and 
behavioral health; cognitive development; language development; and 
educational attainment and academic achievement.43 
                                                                                                                 
 38. See 2011 KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK, supra note 24, at 11; see also HEATHER 
BOUSHEY ET AL., HARDSHIPS IN AMERICA: THE REAL STORY OF WORKING FAMILIES 
2 (2001), available at http://www.epi.org/files/page/-/old/books/hardships_intro.pdf.  
Of families with incomes falling under 200% of the federal poverty line, nearly 30% 
faced at least one critical hardship, e.g., food insecurity, eviction, lack of access to 
essential medical care. Id.  More than 72% had at least one serious hardship, e.g., 
food concerns, insufficient child care, use of emergency room for medical care, and 
these families experienced almost the same incidence of critical and serious hardships 
as families living at or below the poverty line. Id. 
 39. See 2011 KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK, supra note 24, at 7. 
 40. See ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN OF N.J., supra note 31, at 7, 11. 
 41. See 2013 KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK, supra note 26, at 21. 
 42. See 2011 KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK supra note 24, at 10; see also Nat’l Inst. of 
Child Health & Human Dev. Early Child Care Research Network, Duration and 
Developmental Timing of Poverty and Children’s Cognitive and Social Development 
from Birth Through Third Grade, 76 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 795, 795 (2005) (citing 
studies demonstrating that children raised in ‘‘persistent or chronic poverty’’ fare 
worse in cognitive and social development and have poorer physical and mental 
health than those who experience only ‘‘transitory poverty’’). 
 43. See Hirokazu Yoshikawa et al., The Effects of Poverty on the Mental, 
Emotional, and Behavioral Health of Children and Youth, 67 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 
272, 273 (2012) (reviewing literature on the effects of family poverty on mental, 
emotional, and behavioral health); see also Greg J. Duncan & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, 
Family Poverty, Welfare Reform, and Child Development, 71 CHILD DEV. 188, 188 
(2000) (summarizing literature on the likely effects of poverty on child development 
and life chances, and referencing ‘‘countless studies, books and reports’’ showing a 
correlation between children’s poverty and measures of child achievement, behavior 
2013] A POOR IDEA 609 
In the area of child development, studies have revealed the adverse 
effects of poverty on children’s cognitive and language skills.44  For 
example, researchers have identified disparities in the vocabulary 
range of children born to parents with advanced levels of education 
and income and those born to parents with less education and income 
at as early as eighteen months of age.45  One study of language 
development revealed that Newark-born preschoolers’ language 
proficiency falls far below national norms, with 62% of Newark three-
year-olds scoring below the fifteenth percentile on a standardized test 
of English vocabulary, compared to national norms of 15% of three-
year-olds scoring below the fifteenth percentile.46  Still another study 
found that by age four, children living in poverty are on average 
                                                                                                                 
and health).  However, the question remains whether the relationship is a causal one.  
Several models have been proposed to pinpoint specific causal factors for the 
association between socioeconomic status and development, health and well-being, 
such as the direct effects model (poverty influences development and education ‘‘by 
increasing risk factors [associated with poverty] and limiting protective factors’’); the 
family stress model (positing that economic hardship leads to family stress which 
compromises parenting skills, thereby affecting development); and the community 
influences model (considering the characteristics and effects of low-income 
neighborhoods, including high density, crime, underfunded schools, and limited 
socialization opportunities). See Engle & Black, supra note 12, at 245--46.  Still other 
models criticize the aforementioned paradigms for oversimplifying the impact of 
poverty. See, e.g., J. Lawrence Aber et al., The Effects of Poverty on Child Health 
and Development, 18 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 463, 464 (1997) (noting the difficulty 
of untangling ‘‘the effect of poverty per se and the disadvantageous family structures 
common in poor families’’); see also O’Connor & Fernandez, supra note 10, at 6--11 
(arguing that current models conceptualizing the impact of poverty oversimplify the 
problem by failing to acknowledge the effects of culture and bias favoring white, 
middle class norms and thereby reinforcing disproportionality in the special 
education arena).  Regardless of the causal factors, the adverse consequences are 
clear. 
 44. See Kimberly G. Noble et al., Neurocognitive Correlates of Socioeconomic 
Status in Kindergarten Children, 8 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 74, 83 (2005) (describing 
the association between socioeconomic status, cognitive ability and achievement as 
strong, and noting the sizeable effects of socioeconomic status on the language and 
executive functioning systems); see also Brian J. Bigelow, There’s an Elephant in the 
Room: The Impact of Early Poverty and Neglect on Intelligence and Common 
Learning Disorders in Children, Adolescents, and their Parents, 34 DEVELOPMENTAL 
DISABILITIES BULLETIN 177, 202 (2006) (opining that most learning disorders are 
aggravated by or ‘‘actually caused in the presence of’’ persistent poverty, particularly 
in the early years); Jeanne Brooks-Gunn & Greg J. Duncan, The Effects of Poverty 
on Children, CHILD. AND POVERTY, Summer/Fall 1997, at 61 (finding that children 
living below the federal poverty level are 1.3 times more likely than their non-
impoverished peers to have learning disabilities and developmental delays). 
 45. See ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN OF N.J., supra note 31, at 7. 
 46. See BENDHEIM-THOMAN CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON CHILD WELLBEING, 
EARLY LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT (2006), available at http://www.fragilefamilies. 
princeton.edu/newark/Language%20development%20brief%20-%20UE.pdf. 
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eighteen months behind their middle-class peers in cognitive skills 
(e.g., long term memory, attention abilities).47  Researchers have 
determined that children raised in chronically impoverished families 
exhibit more behavior problems as well.48 
For school-age children, the detrimental effects of economic 
hardship persist.  Numerous studies document the link between 
decreased school readiness49 and economic hardship, revealing that 
poor and low-income children commence school at a ‘‘cognitive and 
behavioral disadvantage.’’50  This gap typically widens over time, and 
thus differences in school readiness can have lifelong consequences: 
‘‘School readiness has been shown to be predictive of virtually every 
educational benchmark (e.g., achievement test scores, grade 
retention, special education placement, dropout, etc.).’’51  Researchers 
have examined the converse as well, finding that higher 
socioeconomic status correlates with better academic outcomes for 
children, particularly in the areas of cognition and school measures, 
but also in behavioral and health measures.52  It is significant to note 
that the achievement gap between children from low- and high-
income households increased by as much as 40% for children born in 
2001 compared to children born twenty-five years prior, while the 
racial gap narrowed.53 
                                                                                                                 
 47. See THE CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY, ANNUAL REPORT: INSPIRE/ASPIRE 2 
(2012), http://www.childrensaidsociety.org/files/upload-docs/CAS_AR_web_0.pdf. 
 48. See Engle & Black, supra note 12, at 244 (citing evidence from the National 
Institute of Child Health and Human Development Early Child Care Research 
Network). 
 49. See H.B. Ferguson et al., The Impact of Poverty on Educational Outcomes for 
Children, 12 PEDIATRIC CHILD. HEALTH 701, 701 (2007) (defining school readiness as 
requiring ‘‘physical well-being and appropriate motor development, emotional health 
and a positive approach to new experiences, age-appropriate social knowledge and 
competence, age-appropriate language skills, and age-appropriate general knowledge 
and cognitive skills’’). 
 50. Id. at 701--02. 
 51. See Engle & Black, supra note 12, at 244 (quoting E. ZIGLER, ET AL., A 
VISION FOR UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL EDUCATION 21 (2006)). 
 52. See Ferguson et al., supra note 49, at 702.  For example, a 2011 study found 
that over 80% of African-American, Latino, and Native American fourth graders 
were not proficient in reading, compared to 58% of white students. See 2013 KIDS 
COUNT DATA BOOK, supra note 26, at 26.  When examining the effects of income, 
82% of low-income students were not reading proficient, versus 52% of higher 
income peers. See id.  The percentage breakdowns based on race and economics 
were nearly identical when examining eighth graders’ math proficiency as well. See 
id. at 26, 27. 
 53. See Sean F. Reardon, The Widening Academic Achievement Gap Between 
the Rich and the Poor: New Evidence and Possible Explanations, EDUC. 
LEADERSHIP, May 2013, at 10. 
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Children living in low-income households also are at greater risk of 
leaving school prior to graduation.54  In some economically deprived 
communities, nearly 30% of youth do not graduate from high 
school,55 almost 75% of low-income students and students of color 
who enroll in higher education after high school do not earn a 
degree,56 and only 8% of children born into poverty graduate from 
college by age twenty-five.57  Significantly, 40% of African-American 
and Latino students attend schools where 70--100% of students are 
poor, in contrast to one out of every thirty white students.58 
High school dropouts are at much higher risk of unemployment, 
substance use and abuse, and incarceration than their peers who 
graduate.59  Notably, young people of higher socioeconomic status are 
more likely to get back on track after dropping out of school when 
compared to their peers living in low-income households.60  The 
combined effects of poverty and education create an unending cycle: 
‘‘Poverty limits the chances of educational attainment, and at the 
                                                                                                                 
 54. See Dan Bloom, Programs and Policies to Assist High School Dropouts in the 
Transition to Adulthood, 20 FUTURE OF CHILD., Spring 2010, at 92. 
 55. See THE CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY, supra note 47, at 6 (stating that in the 
United States, one low-income student drops out of high school every 26 seconds 
and, in the communities served by Children’s Aid Society, almost 1/3 of adolescents 
do not graduate from high school). 
 56. See id. at 8. 
 57. See id. at 1. 
 58. See GARY ORFIELD, REVIVING THE GOAL OF AN INTEGRATED SOCIETY: A 
21ST CENTURY CHALLENGE 15 (2009), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/ 
research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/reviving-the-goal-of-an-integrated-
society-a-21st-century-challenge/orfield-reviving-the-goal-mlk-2009.pdf; see also 
ROBERT BALFANZ & NETTIE LEGTERS, LOCATING THE DROPOUT CRISIS, at v (2004), 
available at http://www.csos.jhu.edu/crespar/techReports/Report70.pdf (finding 
nearly 50% of African American students, nearly 40% Latino students, and only 
11% white students attend high schools where graduation is not the norm). 
 59. See DAN BLOOM & RON HASKINS, HELPING HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUTS 
IMPROVE THEIR PROSPECTS 1 (2010), available at http://futureofchildren.org/ 
futureofchildren/publications/docs/20_01_PolicyBrief.pdf; see also Carolyn Hughes & 
Selete K. Avoke, The Elephant in the Room: Poverty, Disability, and Employment, 
RES. & PRACTICE FOR PERSONS WITH SEVERE DISABILITIES, Spring/Summer 2010, at 
6.  For example, a 2007 study found that more than 50% of high school dropouts 
between the ages of 16 and 19 had no paid employment. See Bloom, supra note 54, at 
91; see also Carolyn Hughes, Poverty and Disability: Addressing the Challenge of 
Inequality, CAREER DEV. & TRANSITION FOR EXCEPTIONAL INDIVIDUALS, May 2013, 
at 40 (discussing the ‘‘near 50% unemployment rate of Black urban male high school 
dropouts’’).  Another study revealed that more than two-thirds of state prison 
inmates did not have a high school diploma. See Bloom, supra note 54, at 91; see also 
CAROLYN WOLF HARLOW, EDUCATION AND CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS 1 (2003), 
available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/bjs/ecp.pdf (reporting that 68% of 
prison inmates did not obtain a high school diploma). 
 60. See Bloom, supra note 54, at 92. 
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same time, educational attainment is one of the prime mechanisms for 
escaping poverty.’’61 
B. The Link Between Socioeconomic Status and Disability 
Similar to the interplay between poverty and education, disability 
has been described as ‘‘both a cause and an effect of poverty.’’62  
There is a higher prevalence of poverty among persons with 
disabilities,63 and children living in poverty are at high risk for 
disability.64  In 2010, approximately 19%, or 56.7 million, of the nearly 
304 million United States non-institutionalized civilian population 
reported having one or more disabilities.65  That same year, 
approximately 28.6% of persons with disabilities, ages 15--64, lived in 
poverty, as opposed to 14.5% of non-disabled persons.66 
With respect to children, 8.4% of non-institutionalized young 
people under age fifteen, or 5.2 million, had a disability in 2010, with 
approximately half having a severe disability.67  More than 25% of 
children with disabilities live in households with incomes at or below 
the federal poverty line.68  As is the case for children living in poverty, 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Engle & Black, supra note 12, at 243. 
 62. Hughes & Avoke, supra note 59, at 5; see also Susan L. Parish et al., Material 
Hardship in U.S. Families Raising Children with Disabilities, 75 EXCEPTIONAL 
CHILD. 75, 73 (2008) (‘‘Poverty-----through exposure to environmental hazards-----leads 
to disability, and disability-----by way of increased financial burdens-----leads to 
poverty.’’). 
 63. See Hughes, supra note 59, at 38. 
 64. See Carla A. Peterson et al., Meeting Needs of Young Children at Risk for or 
Having a Disability, EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUC. J., March 2010, at 509, 512 
[hereinafter Meeting Needs]; see also Carla A. Peterson et al., Early Head Start: 
Identifying and Serving Children with Disabilities, TOPICS IN EARLY CHILDHOOD 
SPECIAL EDUC., June 2004, at 76 (discussing the high risk of poor developmental 
outcomes for children living in poverty, and associations between poverty and poorer 
development in cognition, poorer health,  higher rates of learning disabilities, and 
developmental delays). 
 65. MATTHEW W. BRAULT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES: 2010 HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC STUDIES 5 (2012), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p70-131.pdf. 
 66. Id. at 12. 
 67. Id. at 13. 
 68. See Parish et al., supra note 62, at 71 (adding that children with disabilities are 
‘‘significantly more likely to live in families that are considered to be poor’’); see also 
Marcia K. Meyers et al., The Cost of Caring: Childhood Disability and Poor Families, 
84 SOC. SERV. REV. 209, 219 (studying the cost of caring for children with disabilities 
in families living in poverty and finding that childhood disability is ‘‘considerably 
more prevalent among current and recent welfare recipients than in the general 
population’’). 
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children with disabilities are more likely to live in households headed 
by single parents.69 
Poverty-associated risk factors affecting health and development-----
such as food insecurity, harmful housing conditions, insufficient 
stimulation, and poor access to educational and other resources-----can 
place low-income children at greater risk for developing disabilities 
and exacerbate pre-existing disabilities.70  Moreover, childhood 
disability can cause or worsen financial and material hardship, as 
families often must bear additional disability-related costs, including 
specialized treatments, services, daycare, transportation, equipment, 
and technologies.71  It also may hinder employment opportunities for 
parents and caregivers due to the need to stay home and care for their 
children.72  Yet, these same children are less likely to receive 
disability-related services and more likely to confront barriers to 
accessing them.73  One study found that families of children with 
disabilities were ‘‘79% more likely to report that they worried that 
food would run out; 94% more likely to report having cut or skipped 
meals due to money; 73% more likely to have been unable to pay 
their rent in the past year; and 78% more likely to have had phone 
service disconnected in the past year.’’74 
Just as with young people living in low-income households, young 
people with disabilities have low graduation rates and are less likely 
to pursue post-secondary education,75 limiting opportunities for future 
                                                                                                                 
 69. See Glenn T. Fujiura & Kiyoshi Yamaki, Trends in Demography of 
Childhood Poverty and Disability, 66 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 187, 191 (2000) (finding a 
strong association between disability risk and single-parent household status, but 
adding that the greater disability rate among children of color seems to be associated 
with the disproportionate representation of poor and single-parent households in the 
minority community, for no additional risk was correlated with racial or ethnic 
minority status when poverty and family status were statistically controlled). 
 70. See Hughes & Avoke, supra note 59, at 8. 
 71. See Eric Emerson, Poverty and People with Intellectual Disabilities, 13 
MENTAL RETARDATION & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES RES. REV. 107, 109 (2007); 
see also Meyers et al., supra note 68, at 229--30 (finding the direct and indirect costs 
of caring for a child with a disability have significant adverse effects on the family’s 
economic well-being); Parish et al., supra note 62, at 72. 
 72. See Emerson, supra note 71, at 109. 
 73. See Peterson et al., supra note 64, at 509. 
 74. See Emerson, supra note 71, at 108 (citing Susan L. Parrish et al., Economic 
Implications of Caregiving at Midlife: Comparing Parents with and Without Children 
with Disabilities, 42 MENTAL RETARDATION 413 (2004)). 
 75. See Hughes & Avoke, supra note 59, at 7.  For instance, a New York City 
study included young people with disabilities among the five cohorts of youth at high 
risk of leaving school without a diploma. See LAURA WYCKOFF ET AL., 
DISCONNECTED YOUNG PEOPLE IN NEW YORK CITY: CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY 6--7 
(2008), available at http://www.issuelab.org/click/download1/disconnected_young_ 
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success.  In 2010, only 34% of working-age people with disabilities 
had a high school diploma, and only 12% had earned a bachelor’s 
degree or higher.76  As a result, adults with disabilities are more likely 
to experience poverty as well.77 
According to the Bureau of Labor and Statistics, 69.7% of persons 
without disabilities were employed in June 2013, compared with 
20.2% of persons with disabilities.78  Adults with disabilities who work 
tend to be underemployed or receive wages that are below the federal 
poverty level.79  Likewise, nearly 50% of adults who experience 
poverty for at least one year have a disability, as do more than 66% of 
adults who experience persistent poverty.80 
Even when studies control for income, people with disabilities 
remain ‘‘much more likely to experience various forms of material 
hardship-----including food insecurity, not getting needed medical or 
dental care, and not being able to pay rent, mortgage, and utility 
bills-----than people without disabilities.’’81  This finding extends across 
                                                                                                                 
people_in_new_york_city_crisis_and_opportunity (listing the other four cohorts as 
young immigrants, youth involved with the juvenile justice system, youth involved 
with the foster care system, and young mothers). 
 76. See WILLIAM ERICKSON ET AL., 2010 DISABILITY STATUS REPORT, UNITED 
STATES 6 (2012), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi 
?article=1561&context=gladnetcollect; see also WYCKOFF ET AL., supra note 75, at 6 
(reporting that 12,000--15,000 New York City students with disabilities, ages 14--21, 
leave school without  a diploma).  Another study found that only 31% of young 
people with intellectual disabilities were employed post high school and only 7% 
attended postsecondary school as a sole post-school activity. See Hughes, supra note 
59, at 39.  For more information on the postsecondary experiences of young people 
with disabilities, see generally LYNN NEWMAN ET AL., THE POST-HIGH SCHOOL 
OUTCOMES OF YOUNG ADULTS WITH DISABILITIES UP TO EIGHT YEARS AFTER HIGH 
SCHOOL: A REPORT FROM THE NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL TRANSITION STUDY-2 
(NLTS2) (2011), available at 
http://www.nlts2.org/reports/2011_09_02/nlts2_report_2011_09_02_ 
complete.pdf. 
 77. See Hughes, supra note 59, at 39 (noting that adults with disabilities have a 
greater likelihood of experiencing poverty’s adverse effects, including food insecurity, 
poor housing and medical care, and difficulty paying bills). 
 78. Economic News Release: June 2013, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_07052013.htm (scroll down to 
‘‘Table A-6’’). 
 79. See Hughes & Avoke, supra note 59, at 9. 
 80. See SHAWN FREMSTAD, HALF IN TEN: WHY TAKING DISABILITY INTO 
ACCOUNT IS ESSENTIAL TO REDUCING INCOME POVERTY AND EXPANDING 
ECONOMIC INCLUSION 11 (2009), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/ 
publications/poverty-disability-2009-09.pdf (defining persistent poverty as having a 
household income at or below the federal poverty level for at least thirty-six months 
out of a forty-eight-month period). 
 81. See id. at 2. 
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all racial and ethnic groups.82  Thus, the combination of poverty and 
disability can create a situation of double jeopardy for those affected, 
doubling the challenges they face. 
C. The Link between Disability and Educational Outcomes 
Students with disabilities receiving special education services 
continue to ‘‘lag behind their nondisabled peers in educational 
achievements, are often held to lower expectations, are less likely to 
take the full academic curriculum in high school, and are more likely 
to drop out of school.’’83  No studies have examined the overall 
effectiveness of the special education system to determine if, in fact, it 
works.  Empirical and anecdotal evidence, however, support the 
conclusion that several aspects of the system do not work, leaving 
many children with disabilities unidentified or misclassified, receiving 
inappropriate programming and services, or not receiving 
programming and services at all.84 
For example, when comparing students with and without 
disabilities in the area of achievement, grade-level assessments for 
reading and math showed large gaps in performance. One study 
found that on high school twelfth grade assessments, 64% of students 
with disabilities tested as not proficient in reading and 76% tested as 
not proficient in math, in contrast to rates of 24% and 34% 
respectively for students without disabilities.85  Studies also have 
found that students with disabilities who spend more time in general 
education classrooms tend to have better attendance, perform closer 
to grade-level, and perform better on achievement tests than those 
educated in pull-out settings.86  Yet, African-American students with 
disabilities are half as likely to be placed in general education settings 
than their white peers,87 and are more likely to be educated in 
                                                                                                                 
 82. See Hughes, supra note 59, at 39. 
 83. Laudan Aron & Pamela Loprest, Disability and the Education System, 
FUTURE OF CHILD., Spring 2012, at 97. 
 84. See, e.g., id. at 103 (positing that variation across states in disability 
identification rates suggests that there are many factors other than prevalence of 
disability at play, and suggesting that the ‘‘often perverse, financial incentive 
structures’’ in the special education system influence if and how students with 
disabilities are identified and served). 
 85. See id. at 113. 
 86. See Alfredo Artiles et al., Justifying and Explaining Disproportionality, 1968--
2008: A Critique of Underlying Views of Culture, 76 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 279, 285 
(2010). 
 87. See id. 
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segregated settings even when they have the same classification as 
their white peers.88 
As mentioned above, students with disabilities are more likely to 
leave school prior to graduation.89  While on average 11% of high 
school students drop out of school, approximately 50--60% of 
students classified as having emotional or behavioral disabilities leave 
high school without a diploma, as do more than 30% of students with 
learning disabilities.90  Studies report even higher dropout rates for 
youth with disabilities in detention or correctional facilities.91  When 
students with disabilities do graduate, they are less likely to receive a 
traditional high school diploma92 or to attend or complete post-
secondary schooling,93 increasing their likelihood of facing economic 
and material hardship in the future. 
                                                                                                                 
 88. See N.J. COUNCIL ON DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, supra note 10, at 19.  
Racial and ethnic disparities exist in other areas as well. See id. at 18 (reporting that 
African-American students are three times as likely to be classified as having mental 
retardation compared to white students and twice as likely to be classified as having 
multiple disabilities and emotional disturbance, but less likely than white students to 
be classified as having a speech or language impairment). 
 89. See Martha Thurlow et al., Students with Disabilities Who Drop out of 
School-----Implications for Policy and Practice, NAT’L CTR. SECONDARY EDUC. & 
TRANSITION (2002), available at http://www.ncset.org/publications/printresource. 
asp?id=425 (reporting that the dropout rate for students with disabilities is 
approximately double that of students without disabilities). 
 90. See Artiles et al., supra note 86, at 285; see also Suzanne E. Kemp, Dropout 
Policies and Trends for Students with and Without Disabilities, 41 ADOLESCENCE 
235, 236 (2006) (noting that 50--59% of students with emotional/behavioral disorders 
and 32--26% of students with learning disabilities drop out of school). 
 91. See id. (estimating that 30--70% of youth with disabilities in detention and 
correctional institutions drop out of school). 
 92. See Aron & Loprest, supra note 83, at 113 (reporting that in 2005, 46% of 
students with disabilities graduated with a regular diploma versus 75% of non-
disabled students); see also Elisa Hyman et al., How IDEA Fails Families Without 
Means: Causes and Corrections from the Frontlines of Special Education Lawyering, 
20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 107, 136 (2011) (reporting that only 39% of 
students with disabilities ages 16--21 receive a regular high school diploma, with the  
percentage dropping based on certain classifications-----e.g., only 24% of students with 
emotional disturbance earn a high school diploma). 
 93. NEWMAN ET AL., supra note 76, at 16--20 (2011) (explaining that enrollment of 
young adults with disabilities in post-secondary schooling varies widely based upon 
type of disability and type of post-secondary schooling).  For example, in a 2009 
survey, approximately 66% of young adults with a learning disability or 
speech/language impairment reported enrolling in post-secondary schooling, whereas 
only approximately 30% of students with mental retardation or multiple disabilities 
so enrolled.  In contrast, approximately 67% of young adults without disabilities 
reported enrolling in post-secondary schooling. See id.  Notably, young adults with 
disabilities were twice as likely to have enrolled in or attended a two-year college or 
vocational school as opposed to a four-year college, and almost one-third had 
enrolled in more than one type of postsecondary schooling. See id. at 21.  
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D. The Intersection of Socioeconomic Status, Disability, and 
Educational Outcomes 
Just as the effects of poverty are cumulative, so too are the effects 
of learning94-----‘‘consequences at one stage in a child’s development 
can hinder development at a later stage.’’95  Thus, the longer a child 
with a disability fails to receive proper remediation, the more likely 
the disability may become ingrained and less responsive, or even 
unresponsive, to treatment.96  As described above, each of the 
associations between poverty and education, poverty and disability, 
and disability and education, alone, can have devastating outcomes.  
Operating simultaneously, these links may magnify the risk of dire 
consequences even further.97  When one considers the potential 
lifelong effects of a school district’s failure to provide proper special 
education and related services to a child with a disability living in 
poverty, the need for an appropriate remedy becomes eminently 
clear. 
                                                                                                                 
Additionally, young adults with disabilities from households with an annual income 
over $50,000 were more likely than those from households with an annual income of 
$25,000 or less ever to have been enrolled in postsecondary education (70% higher 
income, versus 50%). See id. at 21. But see Aron & Loprest, supra note 83, at 114 
(noting that studies have found adults with disabilities have ‘‘significantly’’ lower 
rates of postsecondary school completion than adults without disabilities). 
 94. Deborah Lowe Vandell et al., Do Effects of Early Child Care Extend to Age 
15 Years? Results from the NICHD Study of Early Child Care and Youth 
Development, 81 CHILD DEV. 737, 751 (2010) (noting that a link between higher 
achievement during the early and adolescent years is no surprise due to the 
cumulative nature of school achievement); see also DONALD J. HERNANDEZ, DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY: HOW THIRD-GRADE READING SKILLS AND POVERTY INFLUENCE HIGH 
SCHOOL GRADUATION 3--4, 9 (2011), available at http://www.aecf.org/~/media/Pubs/ 
Topics/Education/Other/DoubleJeopardyHowThirdGradeReadingSkillsandPovery/
DoubleJeopardyReport040511FINAL.pdf (citing results of a longitudinal study of 
approximately 4000 students finding that those who are not proficient readers by 
third grade are four times more likely to leave school without a diploma than 
proficient readers, and finding that those who do not master basic skills by third 
grade are six times more likely to leave school without a high school diploma.  The 
rate was even higher for African-American and Hispanic students living in poverty). 
 95. Yoshikawa et al., supra note 43, at 274. 
 96. See id.; see also Early Intervention for Children with Disabilities Works, 
Report Finds: Letter No. 142, [Oct.] Accommodating Disabilities Decisions (CCH) 
No. 143 (Oct. 3, 2003), 2003 WL 26457054 (discussing the analogous findings of the 
National Early Intervention Longitudinal Study, which, according to then Assistant 
Secretary for Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, Robert Pasternack, 
provided further evidence that ‘‘the earlier we identify children with disabilities and 
provide [sound] interventions, the better chance they have of reaching their full 
potential’’). 
 97. See, e.g., Hernandez, supra note 94, at 3 (describing the combined effects of 
reading poorly and living in poverty as placing children in ‘‘double jeopardy’’). 
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Despite the challenges, all hope is not lost for these children.  
Numerous studies over the last two decades have found that early, 
intensive, prolonged intervention can affect language, cognition, and 
social development dramatically,98 which can narrow the 
socioeconomic performance gap in these key areas and provide 
benefits that last into adulthood.99  Additionally, researchers have 
opined that, ‘‘children living in poverty benefit more than others from 
early educational settings that are high quality, with children with 
special educational needs demonstrating longer-term benefits.’’100  
Instances exist where early intervention has succeeded in preventing a 
future need for intervention.101  The timing, duration, and 
appropriateness of intervention, however, are critical components of 
success,102 with both early and ongoing interventions necessary for 
remediation: ‘‘[i]t is unrealistic to think of earlier intervention as an 
alternative to later intervention when problems have become 
established: both are needed.’’103 
                                                                                                                 
 98. See P.A. Howard-Jones et al., The Timing of Educational Investment: A 
Neuroscientific Perspective, 2S DEVELOPMENTAL COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE S18, 
S19 (2012); see also Engle & Black, supra note 12, at 248 (reporting that research 
reveals that high-quality preschool services combined with parent involvement and 
improvement in health status can significantly affect a child’s language and cognitive 
skills by the age of five). 
 99. See Howard-Jones et al., supra note 98, at 19; see also Noble et al., supra note 
44, at 84 (reviewing studies finding long-term benefits of early childhood programs 
including ‘‘persistent, cost-effective effects on academic achievement’’). 
 100. Howard-Jones et al., supra note 98, at 23. 
 101. See id. (reporting examples in which early intervention succeeded in 
preventing a need for later intervention). 
 102. See, e.g., Sally E. Shaywitz et al., The Education of Dyslexic Children from 
Childhood to Young Adulthood, 59 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 451, 463, 467 (2008) 
(finding that for children with dyslexia who receive interventions after second grade, 
‘‘it is more challenging to bring [them] up to expected grade levels once they fall 
behind,’’ and that while ‘‘significant improvements in reading can still occur,’’ 
evidence reveals less-consistent positive results than for those who receive 
intervention during the younger years); see also Allyson P. Mackey et al., 
Environmental Influences on Prefrontal Development, in PRINCIPLES OF FRONTAL 
LOBE FUNCTION 146 (Donald T. Struss & Robert T. Knight eds., 2012), available at 
https://courses.cit.cornell.edu/rdr98/papers/Mackey_Bunge_Raizada_Stuss_and_Knig
ht_2nd_Ed_2012.pdf (reporting that a high degree of plasticity for language appears 
to taper off at age eight or earlier); Margje van der Schuit et al., Early Language 
Intervention for Children with Intellectual Disabilities: A Neurocognitive 
Perspective, 32 RES. DEV. DISABILITIES 705, 705, 711 (2011) (finding that early 
intervention produced substantial developmental gains in children with intellectual 
disabilities where the intervention was prolonged and occurred across different 
settings, but that when intervention and assessment stopped, additional growth 
slowed greatly). 
 103. JUNE STATHAM & MARJORIE SMITH, ISSUES IN EARLIER INTERVENTION: 
IDENTIFYING AND SUPPORTING CHILDREN WITH ADDITIONAL NEEDS 12 (2010), 
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Notwithstanding the aggregate adverse effects of the intersection of 
poverty, education, and disability on child outcomes, and the proven 
success of early appropriate interventions, low-income parents of 
children with disabilities face major obstacles in obtaining proper 
educational programming and services for their children.  These 
obstacles often relate to power imbalances that arise from differences 
between school district personnel and parents in education level, 
knowledge base, language, and access to expertise, including legal 
counsel.104  The power imbalances create an unequal playing field that 
favors school districts and impedes parental participation in their 
children’s education, particularly for poor or low-income parents.105  
The imbalances also restrict parents’ ability to advocate successfully 
in the special education arena, thereby hindering access to 
appropriate special education programming and services.106 
To illustrate, a 2003 study of the United States population’s literacy 
skills found that 86% of persons aged 25--29 who are not high school-
educated or the equivalent ‘‘may be considered to have limited 
literacy.’’107  Researchers also have discovered that parents of children 
with disabilities have lower rates of educational attainment than the 
                                                                                                                 
available at http://www.ioe.ac.uk/about/documents/TCRU_Issues_in_Earlier_ 
Intervention.pdf. 
 104. See Daniela Caruso, Bargaining and Distribution in Special Education, 14 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 172--173 (2005) (describing the current special 
education system as yielding ‘‘lower payoffs for needier families, which are on 
average less endowed with bargaining power and therefore less capable of taking 
advantage of participation opportunities’’ in their child’s education); see also Eloise 
Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private Enforcement, 86 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1432 (2011) (explaining how the IDEA’s private 
enforcement system results in wealthier parents of children with disabilities obtaining 
superior services compared to low-income parents of children with disabilities). 
 105. See Carmen Gomez Mandic et al., Readability of Special Education 
Procedural Safeguards, 45 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 195, 200 (2012) (positing that ‘‘parents of 
children with disabilities who are most vulnerable to poor educational, social, and 
employment outcomes-----those from disadvantaged backgrounds-----may also be those 
most likely to experience difficulty being involved in the children’s education,’’ and 
citing to studies demonstrating the ways in which literacy features of the special 
education system may actually impede parental participation in their children’s 
education). 
 106. See Chopp, supra note 2, at 438 (‘‘[W]hen parents do not have the skills or 
resources to advocate for their children, the IEP team becomes one-sided . . . school 
districts make the educational decisions for the disabled child, and the parents-----
without knowing the alternatives-----are left with an IEP into which they had very little 
input.’’). 
 107. Mandic et al., supra note 105, at 198 (‘‘limited literacy’’ is determined by 
scoring at ‘‘below basic’’ or ‘‘basic’’ levels in prose literacy, making one likely to 
experience ‘‘considerable difficulty in performing tasks that required [him/her] to 
integrate or synthesize information from complex or lengthy texts’’). 
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general population and, thus, are more likely to have limited literacy 
skills.108  In accordance with the IDEA, school districts must provide 
parents of children with disabilities with a written copy of their 
procedural safeguards109 one time per year, with some exceptions.110  
The procedural safeguards serve as an informational resource for 
parents: ‘‘These documents represent the primary way in which 
schools provide written notice to parents of their right and their 
children’s rights in the special education system.’’111  They must be 
written in the parents’ native language, unless it is clearly infeasible 
for a school district to do so, and written in an ‘‘easily 
understandable’’ manner.112  Disturbingly, despite these requirements, 
studies have found that more than 50% of procedural safeguards are 
written at the college reading level and 40% at the graduate or 
professional level, rendering the information contained therein 
difficult and sometimes impossible to understand, even for those with 
higher level literacy skills.113 
Further exacerbating the problem, special education evaluation 
reports, testing scores, the Individualized Education Program 
(IEP),114 special education state regulations, and administrative 
hearing rules with which parents must comply when formally 
challenging school district actions all are written in discipline-specific, 
                                                                                                                 
 108. See id. at 198, 200. 
 109. Procedural safeguards provide an explanation of the special education rights 
of children with disabilities and the rights of their parents.  Examples include the 
rights to notice, to review school records, to participate in meetings, and to file a 
complaint. See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400--1482 (2012); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.500--
300.538 (2013). 
 110. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(1)(A) (providing that school districts must make a 
copy of the procedural safeguards available to parents of children with disabilities 
one time per year, as well as upon initial referral of a child for an evaluation, parental 
request for an evaluation, filing of a complaint and parental request for a copy of the 
safeguards). 
 111. See Mandic et al., supra note 105, at 196. 
 112. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(2). 
 113. Mandic et al., supra note 105, at 200; see also Julie L. Fitzgerald & Marley W. 
Watkins, Parents’ Rights in Special Education: The Readability of Procedural 
Safeguards, 72 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 497, 506 (2006) (finding that only 4--8% of 
parents’ rights documents were written at or below the recommended seventh to 
eighth grade reading level, making them too difficult for average people to 
comprehend). 
 114. The ‘‘individualized education program’’ is a written statement for each child 
with a disability that sets forth the child’s strengths and educational needs and 
provides, among other things, a description of the special education and related 
services the child requires in order to make educational progress. See 20 U.S.C. § 
1414(d). 
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technical jargon.115   As such, they typically require higher level 
literacy skills for comprehension.116  Adding the variable of English as 
a second language to the mix impedes parental participation as well, 
and further cements power imbalances in favor of school districts.117 
In addition to the harmful effects of differences in education levels, 
knowledge base, and language, the high cost of challenging school 
district decisions regarding the provision of a free and appropriate 
public education (FAPE) to children with disabilities renders 
successful advocacy, or even the ability to advocate, unattainable for 
many.118   Parents frequently require outside experts to help translate 
and better understand the highly technical, discipline-specific 
language used in a child’s evaluation reports and teacher or service 
provider recommendations.119  To challenge the presumed ‘‘expertise’’ 
of school district professionals in formal dispute resolution processes, 
parents must obtain outside testing, classroom observations, review of 
school records, and expert reports and testimony.120   Hearings 
typically occur over many days and may result in lost time at work, 
                                                                                                                 
 115. This information is based on my personal experience as a special education 
attorney representing low-income parents of children with disabilities in special 
education matters; see also Pasachoff supra note 104, at 1439--40 (2011) (noting that 
poor families tend to be less aware of their special education rights and the ‘‘meaning 
of particular diagnoses’’). 
 116. See Mandic et al., supra note 105, at 200 (‘‘[W]hen literacy and language 
demands exceed people’s skills, access to information, services, and rights is 
compromised.’’). 
 117. See, e.g., Nydia Torres-Burgo et al., Perceptions and Needs of Hispanic and 
Non-Hispanic Parents of Children Receiving Learning Disabilities Services, 23 
BILINGUAL RES. J. 373, 379 (1999) (finding that school districts significantly less often 
explained IDEA rights to parents in their native language of Spanish, and 
significantly less often asked parents if they understood their children’s IEPs than 
they did for non-Hispanic parents.). 
 118. This information is based on my personal experience as a special education 
attorney representing low-income parents of children with disabilities in special 
education matters.  For background, see Michael A. Rebell, The Right to 
Comprehensive Educational Opportunity, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 47, 115 n.309 
(2012) (theorizing that ‘‘because of the advocacy skills and resources of their 
parents,’’ students from middle class and high income families enjoy special education 
benefits to a greater extent than children from impoverished families).  For 
additional background, see Pasachoff, supra note 104, at 1417 (‘‘[E]vidence suggests 
that children from wealthier families enforce their rights under the [IDEA] at higher 
rates than do children in poverty . . . .’’). 
 119. This information is based on my personal experience as a special education 
attorney representing low-income parents of children with disabilities in special 
education matters. 
 120. Id. 
622 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. 41 
additional childcare costs, and other expenses, including the cost of 
legal representation.121 
Parents of children with disabilities from low-income households 
confront extremely difficult odds when challenging school districts for 
failing to educate their children properly.  Few receive the help of an 
attorney, due to continual underfunding of the legal services system.  
According to Legal Services of New Jersey, approximately one in 
every four state residents qualifies for free legal services; at current 
funding rates, however, there is only one legal services attorney for 
every 11,000 eligible clients, resulting in thousands of social and legal 
problems that go unaddressed each year.122  Fewer than ten attorneys 
in New Jersey routinely provide free legal representation to low-
income parents of children with disabilities in special education 
matters, and even fewer accompany a parent through a due process 
hearing123.124  As a result, low-income parents typically are left to 
challenge school districts on their own.125 
While parents of children with disabilities from low-income 
households are less likely to receive legal assistance in pursuing 
special education challenges against school districts, legal 
representation is one of the greatest determinants of success in a 
special education due process hearing.126  According to an Illinois 
study, parents won approximately 50% of special education due 
process hearings when represented by a lawyer; without legal 
representation, they won only 16.8% of hearings.127  These numbers 
                                                                                                                 
 121. Id. 
 122. See The New Jersey Legal Services System at a Glance, LEGAL SERVICES N.J. 
(July 22, 2013), http://www.lsnj.org/PDFs/Glance.pdf. 
 123. A due process hearing is a trial-like legal proceeding in which all parties have 
an opportunity to present evidence and make arguments before an impartial 
administrative law judge.  The judge then issues a decision which is considered final 
but appealable. See generally Cali Cope-Kasten, Bidding (Fair)well to Due Process: 
The Need for a Fairer Final Stage in Special Education Dispute Resolution, 42 J.L. & 
EDUC. 501 (2013) (describing and evaluating the IDEA’s due process hearing 
mechanism in detail). 
 124. This number does not include private attorneys who occasionally handle 
special education matters pro bono. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., LEGAL SERVICES 
CORPORATION 2012 FACT BOOK 18--19 (2013), available at 
http://www.lsc.gov/sites/lsc.gov/files/LSC/lscgov4/AnnualReports/2012_Fact%20Book
_FINALforWEB.pdf (noting that out of the approximately 809,000 cases closed 
nationwide by LSC in 2012, 0.7% were education matters, and 0.2%, or just short of 
2000 cases, pertained to special education matters). 
 125. See MELANIE ARCHER, ACCESS AND EQUITY IN THE DUE PROCESS SYSTEM: 
ATTORNEY REPRESENTATION AND HEARING OUTCOMES IN ILLINOIS 1997--2002, at 6 
(2002), available at http://www.dueprocessillinois.org/Access.pdf. 
 126. See id. at 7. 
 127. See id. 
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are further discouraging when one considers that attorneys represent 
school districts in 94% of due process hearings, and parents in only 
44% of these matters.128  Due to the cost and shortage of free legal 
representation in special education matters, wealthy parents access 
the private enforcement scheme of the IDEA more than low-income 
parents.129  Notably, ‘‘[w]hen poor children enforce their rights at 
lower rates than wealthier children, the dynamics tend to lead to 
better services for wealthier children.’’130  In light of these power 
imbalances and cost impediments, it is no wonder that more and more 
school districts seek to contain expenses by limiting or reducing 
services for those with the quietest voices. 
Society should invest its time, money, and resources in fully 
implementing the IDEA’s mandate to provide every child with a 
disability with a FAPE in the least restrictive environment, and 
improving the timeliness and appropriateness of educational 
interventions.  Until society cures the ills at the front end of the 
system, however, legislators and the courts must strengthen remedies 
on the back-end for low-income children with disabilities who 
wrongfully have been denied appropriate special education and 
related services.  More than ten years of admittedly anecdotal 
experience on the part of this author reveals that, in some low-income 
communities, school districts factor into the cost-benefit-risk analysis 
the likelihood they will get caught or taken to task for denying 
children with disabilities desperately needed programming and 
services to which they are entitled.131   Because so few parents of 
children with disabilities in these communities have the necessary 
support, knowledge, skills, and resources to successfully challenge 
school districts, some districts play the odds and routinely win; even 
when school districts lose, the cost seldom is so great that it deters 
them from playing the odds again and again.132  In so doing, these 
                                                                                                                 
 128. See id.  Although this study did not examine family income and the need for 
free legal services, one may posit, though not conclude, that based on the shortage of 
free legal counsel in special education matters, many parents who did not have legal 
representation came from low-income households. 
 129. See Pasachoff, supra note 104, at 1417--18. 
 130. Id. at 1419; see also Chopp, supra note 2, at 447 (‘‘Where there are finite 
resources, these resources will be allocated to those who advocate most forcefully for 
them, i.e., to the children whose parents have the wherewithal and financial means to 
enforce their children’s due process rights.’’). 
 131. Since 2001, the author has represented low-income parents of children with 
disabilities in special education matters as a clinical professor in the Education and 
Health Law Clinic at Rutgers University School of Law-Newark. 
 132. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Where Have All the Lawsuits Gone? The Shockingly 
Small Role of the Courts in Implementing the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
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school districts perpetuate inequality in the special education system 
based on socioeconomic status.  This Article proposes that a first step 
in breaking the cycle is providing an adequate remedial scheme for 
the children affected. 
II.  OVERVIEW OF THE IDEA’S REMEDIAL SCHEME 
The IDEA is the primary federal law governing the education of 
children with disabilities.133   It offers federal funding to states in 
exchange for states’ commitment to implement a special education 
program that abides by the Act’s mandates.134  In accordance with the 
law, states must provide eligible students with disabilities between the 
ages of three and twenty-one with a ‘‘free and appropriate public 
education’’135 in the least restrictive environment.136  To be eligible for 
programming and services under the IDEA, a child must have a 
statutorily recognized disability, and the disability must adversely 
affect the child’s ability to learn such that the child requires special 
education and related services. 137   Once a child is found eligible, the 
school district must develop an Individualized Education Program 
(IEP) that is designed to meet the child’s unique needs.138  The IEP 
serves as the primary vehicle for the implementation of a child’s 
                                                                                                                 
Act 12 (Faculty Working Paper Series No. 08-12-05, 2008) (noting that, on average, 
school districts spend nine dollars per classified student on litigation costs in one 
year). 
 133. In addition to the IDEA, other anti-discrimination legislation such as section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012), and Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012), ensures access to 
an appropriate education for students with disabilities. 
 134. See 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (2012) (authorizing grants to states for provision of 
special education and related services to children with disabilities in accordance with 
the IDEA). 
 135. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2012); see also id. § 1412(a)(1)(A). A ‘‘free and 
appropriate public education’’ is defined as ‘‘educational instruction specially 
designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such 
services as are necessary to permit the child ‘to benefit’ from the instruction.’’ Bd. of 
Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188--89 (1982) (requiring states to provide only a 
minimum floor of educational opportunity to students, not the best education 
possible). 
 136. See § 1412(a)(5)(A); Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1213 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(holding that the Act’s ‘‘least restrictive environment’’ mandate requires school 
districts to educate children with disabilities with children without disabilities to the 
maximum extent appropriate). 
 137. See § 1401(3) (defining an eligible student with a disability as a student who 
needs special education and related services due to mental retardation, hearing 
impairments, speech or language impairments, visual impairments, serious emotional 
disturbance, orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, specific learning 
disabilities, or other health impairments); see also § 1401(26), (29). 
 138. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181. 
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special education and related services; it is a written plan that sets 
forth, among other things, the child’s present levels of performance, 
the child’s educational strengths and needs, the programs and services 
the child will receive, and the measurable goals the child is expected 
to attain.139 
The Act provides detailed procedural safeguards to protect the 
rights of parents and children.140  Among the procedural safeguards, 
states must implement methods for parents and guardians to 
challenge the identification, evaluation, classification, programming, 
and provision of a FAPE to their children in the event they disagree 
with school district decisions.141  This includes providing processes for 
the filing of a complaint with the state, a request for mediation, an 
impartial due process hearing, and/or bringing a civil action.142 
When a parent of a child with a disability brings an action against a 
school district, either in the form of a due process hearing or a civil 
action, the IDEA (and prior versions of the Act) grants judges broad 
discretion in their remedial authority.  The IDEA provides that the 
court ‘‘shall grant such relief as [it] determines is appropriate.’’143  
Through litigation over the course of more than thirty-five years, the 
Third Circuit has translated this authority into the following types of 
relief: equitable remedies of tuition reimbursement and/or 
compensatory education, general declaratory relief,144 injunctive 
relief,145 and, for a limited time, monetary damages.146  Parents may 
obtain these forms of relief through the administrative hearing 
process, with the exception of monetary damages and attorneys’ fees 
and costs.147  Relevant to this Article are the remedies of tuition 
                                                                                                                 
 139. See § 1401(14); see also id. § 1414(d). 
 140. See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400--1482 (2012). 
 141. See id. 
 142. See id. 
 143. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii); 34 C.F.R. 300.516(c)(3) (2013). 
 144. Examples of declaratory relief include a court’s determination that a child is 
eligible for special education and related services, or that a school district provided a 
FAPE to a child with a disability. 
 145. For example, injunctive relief may be awarded in actions regarding the 
IDEA’s ‘‘stay put’’ provision by requiring school districts to continue paying for 
programming and services for a child pending resolution of the dispute. 
 146. The Third Circuit previously permitted awards of monetary damages, using § 
1983 to enforce the IDEA. See generally supra note 17 and accompanying text.  Since 
damages are no longer an available remedy in the Third Circuit, I will not discuss 
them here. 
 147. For a detailed discussion of the remedial authority of hearing officers in 
special education disputes, see generally Perry A. Zirkel, The Remedial Authority of 
Hearing and Review Officers Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: 
An Update, 31 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1 (2011). 
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reimbursement and compensatory education, and both are discussed 
in more detail below. 
A. Tuition Reimbursement 
Aside from declaratory and injunctive relief, tuition 
reimbursement is the primary remedy courts may award to parents of 
children with disabilities.  The U.S. Supreme Court established tuition 
reimbursement as a form of equitable relief in IDEA matters in 1985 
with its decision in School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. 
Department of Education.148  There, the Court held that when a 
school district develops an inappropriate IEP for a student and the 
parent unilaterally opts to pay for and place the student in a private 
school instead, the court has the authority to award tuition 
reimbursement, provided that the parent demonstrates the 
appropriateness of the unilateral placement.149  The Court determined 
that reimbursement does not qualify as monetary damages because it 
merely requires the school district to pay for programming and 
services the district should have paid at the outset had it developed an 
appropriate IEP for the student.150  To hold otherwise would provide 
a right without a remedy.151  Recognizing the ‘‘ponderous’’152 nature of 
the review process, the Court opined that a parent should not have to 
keep his or her child in an inappropriate educational program.153  The 
Court cautioned, however, that parents who unilaterally change their 
children’s placements act at their own financial risk, as there is no 
guarantee of reimbursement.154 
Eight years later, in Florence County School District Four v. Carter 
ex rel. Carter, the Court extended the right to tuition reimbursement 
to students placed unilaterally by their parents in non-state-approved 
private schools.155  The Court permitted an award of tuition 
reimbursement as long as the parent demonstrated the 
inappropriateness of the school district’s IEP and the appropriateness 
of the private school placement.156  Subsequent rulings in the Third 
                                                                                                                 
 148. 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985). 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id. at 370--71. 
 151. See id. at 370 (finding that a ‘‘child’s right to a free appropriate education . . . 
would be less than complete’’ if the court refused to allow tuition reimbursement as 
an available remedy under IDEA). 
 152. See id. at 370. 
 153. See id. at 373--74. 
 154. See id. 
 155. 510 U.S. 7, 13 (1993). 
 156. See id. at 15--16. 
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Circuit and Supreme Court further refined the requirements for and 
restrictions on tuition reimbursement as a remedy in unilateral 
placement cases.  For example, the Third Circuit held that a private 
placement need not be perfect, only appropriate,157 and that the 
private placement does not have to develop an IEP for the student.158  
With respect to restrictions on the remedy, the Third Circuit held that 
a court may deny reimbursement on equitable grounds if a parent 
fails to cooperate with the school district in its attempt to provide the 
student with a FAPE.159 
Congress codified tuition reimbursement as a remedy for the denial 
of a FAPE in its 1997 amendments to the IDEA.160  The IDEA 
restricts this right by permitting courts to reduce or deny 
reimbursement when a parent fails to provide proper notice of intent 
to unilaterally place a child in a private school and seek 
reimbursement, or a parent acts unreasonably (e.g. does not 
cooperate or acts in bad faith).161  Therefore, in tuition reimbursement 
cases, the onus for identifying a problem’s existence and notifying the 
school district of the problem rests with parents, and courts may 
reduce or deny the remedy if the parent fails to adhere to these 
requirements. 
For those without means, tuition reimbursement has remained an 
elusive remedy.  Without the financial ability to pay for special 
education programming and services outside the school district, low-
income families of children with disabilities had only declaratory and 
injunctive relief available.  While these forms of relief serve to 
remediate present and future harms, they do not compensate children 
with disabilities for past denials of proper programming and services. 
B. Compensatory Education 
The remedy of compensatory education evolved out of the 
realization that no form of recompense existed for parents unable to 
‘‘front’’ the costs of unilateral placement or outside services for their 
                                                                                                                 
 157. See Warren G. v. Cumberland Cnty. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 80, 84 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 158. See Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 276 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 159. See C.H. v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist., 606 F.3d 59, 71--73 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(holding that where parents refused to allow the District to conduct speech and 
language evaluations on their child, repeatedly delayed and then failed to attend IEP 
meetings, and failed to notify the District that they had unilaterally placed their child 
in a private school, equitable considerations warranted the denial of tuition 
reimbursement). 
 160. Act of June 4, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (codified as amended at 
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) (2012)). 
 161. Id. 
628 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. 41 
children.162  It is designed to redress prior denials of a FAPE by 
helping IDEA-eligible children with disabilities recoup educational 
progress lost due to a school district’s delay in offering, or failure to 
provide, proper educational programming and services.163  
Compensatory education may take different forms, such as 
afterschool instruction to a school-age student or additional 
programming and services for a student beyond the age of twenty-
one.164 
The first major case awarding compensatory education involved a 
school district’s failure to provide a FAPE for three years to a child 
with severe learning and behavioral issues stemming from a brain 
tumor.165  The child’s family could not afford to pay for private 
options.166   The Eighth Circuit extended the Burlington rationale by 
requiring the school district to pay expenses it should have paid all 
along had it educated the child properly.167  To support its holding, the 
Eighth Circuit determined that school districts should not escape 
from liability merely because a parent is unable to pay the cost of a 
private education; to opine otherwise would contradict Congressional 
intent and the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington.168  Thus, 
compensatory education became the primary means of redress for 
children denied a FAPE who remain in inappropriate educational 
programs due to their parents’ financial inability to cover the costs of 
private schooling and services.169 
The Third Circuit adopted the Eighth Circuit’s rationale in 1990, in 
Lester H. ex rel. Octavia P. v. Gilhool, reasoning that Congress ‘‘did 
not intent to offer a remedy only to those parents able to afford an 
                                                                                                                 
 162. See Lester H. ex rel. Octavia P. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 872--73 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(holding that courts have the authority to grant compensatory education as a remedy, 
following the rationale of the Eighth Circuit, which held that a school district should 
not escape liability for providing educational programming and services to a child 
with a disability simply because the parent could not provide them, as ‘‘Congress did 
not intend the child’s entitlement to a free education to turn upon her parent’s ability 
to ‘front’ its costs’’ (quoting Miener v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 752--53 (8th Cir. 1986)). 
 163. See id. at 872. 
 164. See supra note 21 (defining ‘‘compensatory education’’). 
 165. See Miener, 800 F.2d at 751. 
 166. See id. 
 167. See id. at 753. 
 168. See id. at 753.  The Second Circuit, in Burr v. Ambach, similarly concluded 
that compensatory education was a necessary remedy under IDEA because Congress 
would not have intended to ‘‘create a right without a remedy.’’ 863 F.2d 1071, 1078 
(2d Cir. 1988), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom., Sobol v. Burr, 492 
U.S. 902 (1989). 
 169. Some parents also may choose not to front the costs of programming and 
services even if they are financially able. 
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alternative private education.’’170  Numerous Third Circuit decisions 
followed, further defining the contours of compensatory education as 
a remedy.171  Pursuant to these decisions, a parent must demonstrate 
that the IEP is not appropriate, but need not show bad faith on the 
part of the school district.172  In addition, a child with a disability may 
be entitled to compensatory education even if not classified 
previously as eligible for special education.173  To the detriment of 
parents, courts also have held that there must be a substantive 
violation of the child’s right to a FAPE in order to qualify for a 
compensatory education award; procedural violations alone do not 
justify this remedy.174 
To measure the amount of a compensatory education award, the 
Third Circuit determined that a child with a disability is entitled to 
receive compensatory education and related services for the duration 
of the FAPE deprivation minus the reasonable time needed for the 
school district to correct the problem.175  The court established that 
‘‘the right to compensatory education should accrue from the point 
that the school district knows or should know’’176 of the denial of a 
FAPE.   In doing so, the court placed the onus of identifying a FAPE 
denial squarely on school districts, reasoning that ‘‘a child’s 
entitlement to special education should not depend upon the vigilance 
of the parents (who may not be sufficiently sophisticated to 
comprehend the problem).’’177 
In essence, over the last twenty years, a parent’s socioeconomic 
status has become the primary factor determining which of the two 
equitable remedies-----tuition reimbursement or compensatory 
education-----a parent may access.  Although courts have used both 
remedies widely throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Congress elected to 
codify only the former.  In fact, the only reference to compensatory 
services as a remedy appears in the IDEA 2004 federal implementing 
regulations as a potential remedy within a state’s internal complaint 
                                                                                                                 
 170. See Lester H. ex rel. Octavia P. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 873 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 171. See, e.g., Michael P. ex rel. P.P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 
738 (3d Cir. 2009); Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 249--50 
(3d Cir. 1998); Carlisle Area Sch. v. Scott P., 62 F. 3d 520, 537 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 172. See Scott P., 62 F.3d at 537. 
 173. See Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 249--50. 
 174. See P.P., 585 F.3d at 738. 
 175. See M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Central Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 397 (3d Cir. 
1996). 
 176. Id. at 396--97 (emphasis added); see also Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. 
Deflaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 272 (3d Cir. 2007); Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 250. 
 177. M.C., 81 F.3d at 397. 
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resolution process.178  Congress’ failure to codify compensatory 
education as an available remedy, while devoting significant attention 
to the rights and responsibilities of parents and children with 
disabilities unilaterally placed in private school, relegates 
compensatory education to a second class status with significant 
implications.  Foremost, because the Act does not list compensatory 
education as a remedy, school districts have no duty to include it in 
the procedural safeguards or other materials they distribute to 
parents.179  As set forth in Part I, parents rely on procedural 
safeguards to understand the special education system and their 
rights.  As a result, many do not even know this remedy exists.180 
Moreover, children unilaterally placed by their parents in private 
schools presumably receive a FAPE immediately following 
placement, giving them an ‘‘immediacy of benefits’’181  unavailable to 
students for whom compensatory education is the only available 
remedy.  As a result, children with disabilities living in low-income 
households are forced to remain in allegedly inappropriate 
educational programs, at times for years, pending the dispute 
                                                                                                                 
 178. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.151(b)(1) (2013) (‘‘In resolving a complaint in which the 
[state educational agency] has found a failure to provide appropriate services, a[] 
[state educational agency] . . . must address-----(1) The failure to provide appropriate 
services, including corrective action appropriate to address the needs of the child 
(such as compensatory services or monetary reimbursement) . . . .’’).  The 1999 
version of the federal regulations provided an award of monetary reimbursement or  
‘‘other corrective action appropriate to the needs of the child’’ as remedies for the 
denial of appropriate services. 34 C.F.R. § 300.660(b) (1999).  The 1999 version 
further directed that a complaint must allege a violation that occurred 
not more than one year prior to the date that the complaint is 
received . . . unless a longer period is reasonable because the violation is 
continuing, or the complainant is requesting compensatory services for a 
violation that occurred not more than three years prior to the date the 
complaint is received. 
34 C.F.R. § 300.662 (1999, repealed 2006); see Doug Goldberg, OSEP Letter to 
Margaret Kohn, 17 EHLR 522 (1990), SPECIAL EDUC. ADVISOR (July 10, 1990), 
http://www.specialeducationadvisor.com/osep-letter-to-margaret-kohn-17-ehlr-522-
1990 (providing that compensatory education is an appropriate means to remedy a 
prior FAPE denial, and adding, ‘‘Further, compensatory education may be the only 
means through which children forced to remain in an inappropriate placement due to 
their parents’ financial inability to pay for an appropriate private placement would 
receive FAPE.’’). 
 179. See Hyman et al., supra note 92, at 129--30. 
 180. See id. 
 181. Ralph D. Mawdsley, Post Forest Grove Parental Reimbursement for Private 
School Placements: What about Parents Who Cannot Afford the Cost of Such 
Placements?, 292 EDUC. LAW REP. 1, 20 (2013). 
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resolution process,182 ‘‘leaving less time to close gaps left open or 
widened by the denial of FAPE.’’183  These children often do not 
recoup this critical education and development time, no matter the 
quality or quantity of services courts award on the back end.184  
Furthermore, disparities exist in measuring these two remedies.  
Courts typically calculate and award tuition reimbursement based on 
years spent in the private placement while measuring compensatory 
education in terms of service hours or days of instruction missed, 185 
resulting in, at times, a significantly reduced award.  As children with 
disabilities in low-income households disproportionately rely on 
compensatory education as their sole remedy for the denial of a 
FAPE, they suffer the most from the adverse effects of this second-
class cure. 
III.  APPLICATION OF THE IDEA 2004’S STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS TO COMPENSATORY EDUCATION CLAIMS IN THE 
THIRD CIRCUIT 
As this Part demonstrates, the last decade has brought a marked 
change in the Third Circuit’s approach to compensatory education as 
a remedy.  Recent opinions indicate misapplication and excessively 
restrictive interpretation of the IDEA 2004’s statute of limitations 
provision and its exceptions. These decisions exhibit a 180-degree 
shift in Third Circuit courts’ approach to remedies under the IDEA, 
and unfairly limit the remedial options available to children from low-
income households. 
A. Timelines for Filing Special Education Claims Pre-IDEA 
2004 
Prior to the 2004 amendments, the IDEA did not impose any time 
limits on bringing special education administrative level claims or civil 
actions.  To counter this omission, the Third Circuit issued several 
decisions during the 1990s delineating parameters for the time period 
                                                                                                                 
 182. See Seligmann & Zirkel supra note 18, at 299 (‘‘[I]t remains true that from the 
start of a dispute to its final resolution, much time can elapse especially during a court 
proceeding.’’).  Additionally, in my experience, I have seen several examples of cases 
taking more than two years to make it through the administrative hearing process 
alone, not including appeal. 
 183. Seligmann & Zirkel, supra note 18, at 296. 
 184. See generally supra Part I. 
 185. See Zirkel, supra note 17, at 896. 
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in which a claim may be filed.186  In so doing, the court took divergent 
positions in tuition reimbursement suits and compensatory education 
actions regarding the timeframe for filing a complaint, the 
responsibility for identifying a FAPE denial, and the starting point for 
the accrual of a claim. 
As to the timeframe for filing a complaint seeking tuition 
reimbursement, the Third Circuit in Bernardsville Board of 
Education v. J.H. held that a parent’s failure to initiate administrative 
grievance procedures more than one year following unilateral 
placement ‘‘without mitigating excuse . . . is an unreasonable delay.’’187  
The court based its decision on the rationale that school districts are 
entitled to notice, in the form of initiation of review proceedings 
within a reasonable time, of a parent’s intent to unilaterally place a 
child and seek reimbursement.188  Such notice allows the district to 
determine whether it should continue to review and revise the IEP: 
‘‘[T]he right of review contains a corresponding parental duty to 
unequivocally place in issue the appropriateness of an IEP.’’189 
In contrast, the Third Circuit in Ridgewood refused to extend the 
statute of limitations on tuition reimbursement claims to the filing of 
first level (administrative) compensatory education claims.190  The 
court held that any time limits on the filing of compensatory 
education claims did not accrue until after administrative proceedings 
had concluded.191  Due to the IDEA’s requirement that parents 
exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing a claim in state or 
federal court,192 compensatory education claims typically escaped 
application of time limits on filing to the benefit of parents. 
In the 1997 amendments to the IDEA, Congress added notice 
requirements and conditions on reimbursement, effectively placing 
the duty to identify a FAPE denial on parents in tuition 
                                                                                                                 
 186. See, e.g., Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v. J.H., 42 F.3d 149, 158 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(discussing, in 1994, the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the appropriate timeframe 
for filing a tuition reimbursement claim); see also Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex 
rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 250--51 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing, in 1999, the Third Circuit’s 
interpretation of the statute of limitations for compensatory education claims). 
 187. J.H., 42 F.3d at 158. 
 188. See id. at 158. 
 189. Id. at 162. 
 190. See Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 250. 
 191. See id. at 251; see also Jeremy H. ex rel. Hunter v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 
95 F.3d 272, 280--81 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 192. See Jeremy H., 95 F.3d at 281 (citing the IDEA’s mandate that an aggrieved 
party must exhaust the state’s administrative procedures prior to bringing an IDEA 
claim in state or federal court, unless doing so would be futile). 
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reimbursement cases.193  For example, a court may limit or deny 
reimbursement if a parent fails to inform the school district, at the last 
IEP meeting, of his intent to place the child in a private school and 
seek reimbursement, or does not provide written notice to the school 
district ten business days before the child’s removal.194  As long as a 
parent complies with the IDEA’s notice requirements, the child’s 
start date at the unilateral placement becomes the starting point for 
the accrual of the tuition reimbursement claim.195 
As explained in Part II above, the Third Circuit placed the duty to 
identify problems with the identification, evaluation, placement, and 
provision of a FAPE exclusively on school districts in actions 
involving compensatory education.196  ‘‘[I]t is the responsibility of the 
child’s teachers, therapists, and administrators-----and of the 
multidisciplinary team that annually evaluates the student’s 
progress-----to ascertain the child’s educational needs, respond to 
deficiencies, and place him or her accordingly.’’197  The vesting of this 
responsibility squarely in school districts coincided with the IDEA’s 
mandates: given that school districts have an affirmative duty to 
identify, evaluate, and provide a FAPE to all eligible children,198 by 
extension, they also have a duty to identify situations in which they 
have failed to provide a FAPE.  Following this rationale, the Third 
Circuit determined that a compensatory education claim accrues from 
the time that the school district knows, or should have known, of the 
FAPE denial.199 
                                                                                                                 
 193. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C) (2012); see also, e.g., C.H. v. Cape Henlopen 
Sch. Dist., 606 F.3d 59, 72 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding that parents acted unreasonably by 
failing to notify the school district in a timely manner of their intent to seek tuition 
reimbursement for the unilateral placement of their child in a private school, and 
therefore denying the parents’ reimbursement claim). 
 194. See § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I). But see § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iv) (excusing a parent 
from the notice requirement if he is illiterate and cannot write English, if compliance 
would cause physical or serious emotional harm to the child, or if the school 
prevented the parent from giving notice). 
 195. See generally § 1412(a)(10)(C). 
 196. See M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Cent. Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 397 (3d Cir. 1996); 
see also Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 250 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
 197. M.C., 81 F.3d at 397. 
 198. See § 1412(a)(1), (3) (describing states’ duty to ensure that a FAPE is 
available to all children with disabilities ages three to twenty-one and requiring that 
all children with disabilities be identified, located, and evaluated for special education 
eligibility). 
 199. See M.C., 81 F.3d at 396; see also Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 
480 F.3d 259, 272 (3d Cir. 2007); Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 250--51. 
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The Third Circuit’s disparate positions on time limits for filing 
claims and determining when claims accrue in tuition reimbursement 
and compensatory education matters are solidly grounded in logic.  
Filing requirements such as parental notice and time limits for tuition 
reimbursement claims are common sense, because the school district 
may be held responsible for paying substantial sums of money 
retroactively (and often, once the decision is rendered, 
prospectively).200   For this reason, the Third Circuit, and Congress in 
the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA, permitted reduction and even 
denial of tuition reimbursement in the event a parent acts 
unreasonably or in bad faith.201  Notably, however, the Third Circuit 
did not place prior notice requirements and time limits on first-level 
compensatory education claims.  In compensatory education matters, 
school districts are not placed in the same position of risk,202 for 
children typically remain in their same allegedly inappropriate 
educational program for the duration of the dispute, and remedies 
come in the form of additional future programming and services.203  
Some have posited that these disparate positions stem from ad-hoc 
decision-making,204 proposing that the only difference between the 
two remedies lies in a parent’s election of which one to choose-----‘‘the 
financial risk of a unilateral private placement . . . [or] forego[ing] this 
risk [and awaiting] the outcome of the Act’s ‘ponderous’ review 
process.’’205  Those espousing this view fail to recognize that, for 
families without means, no choice exists. 
This Article proposes the contrary view, namely that the Third 
Circuit intentionally employed distinct approaches.  The court’s 
opinions resulted from recognition that while tuition reimbursement 
and compensatory education are both equitable remedies that stem 
                                                                                                                 
 200. See Zirkel, supra note 17, at 895--96 (describing the parent’s ‘‘high stakes 
unilateral action’’ in tuition reimbursement cases as ‘‘warranting clear notice to the 
district of its last-chance opportunity to have the IEP team to resolve the matter, thus 
avoiding the mutual risk of undue costs’’). 
 201. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(III); see also, e.g., C.H. v. Cape Henlopen 
Sch. Dist., 606 F.3d 59, 72 (3d Cir. 2010) (denying tuition reimbursement due to 
parents’ unreasonable conduct). 
 202. See Zirkel, supra note 17, at 896 (describing the level of risk as ‘‘less acute’’ in 
matters regarding compensatory education) 
 203. But see Ferren C. v. Sch. Dist., 595 F. Supp. 2d 566, 569 (E.D. Pa. 2009) 
(noting that in past disputes between the parties regarding compensatory education, 
the school district created a trust fund in the amount of over $200,000 to be used for 
compensatory education and related services). 
 204. See Zirkel, supra note 17, at 893 (describing the Third Circuit’s disparate 
treatment of tuition reimbursement and compensatory education as an ‘‘ad hoc 
framework’’). 
 205. Id. at 894. 
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from the IDEA’s ‘‘broad grant for appropriate relief’’ and ‘‘are 
premised on a denial of the eligible child’s entitlement to FAPE,’’206  
they differ substantially in their availability, application and effects.  
As such, they require disparate treatment.207 
B. Courts’ Misapplication and Overly Restrictive Interpretation 
of the IDEA 2004’s Statute of Limitations and its Exceptions in 
Compensatory Education Matters 
The Third Circuit’s distinct treatment of the remedies of tuition 
reimbursement and compensatory education persisted until the 
implementation of the 2004 IDEA amendments, when Congress 
added a statute of limitations to the Act.208  The statute of limitations 
sets a time limit on the filing of claims regarding special education 
identification, evaluation, placement, or the provision of a FAPE.209  
The amended IDEA provides, in pertinent part: 
(C) Timeline for requesting hearing. A parent or agency shall 
request an impartial due process hearing within 2 years of the date 
the parent or agency knew or should have known about the alleged 
action that forms the basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an 
                                                                                                                 
 206. See id. at 894. 
 207. Disparate treatment of tuition reimbursement and compensatory education 
claims is not unique to the Third Circuit.  Although the IDEA did not include a 
statute of limitations prior to the 2004 amendments, the U.S. Department of 
Education (DOE), in the IDEA’s implementing regulations, distinguished the two 
remedies in terms of the timing for filing claims.  Following codification of tuition 
reimbursement as a remedy in 1997, the DOE included statute of limitations 
language in the 1999 regulations, in a reference to state complaint procedures.  The 
regulations stated that a complaint must allege a violation occurring ‘‘not more than 
one year prior to the date that the complaint is received . . . unless a longer period is 
reasonable because the violation is continuing, or the complainant is requesting 
compensatory services for a violation that occurred not more than three years prior 
to the date the complaint is received.’’ 34 C.F.R. § 300.662 (repealed 2006).  In 
addition, rather than treat these remedies similarly, Congress opted not to codify 
compensatory education in either the 1997 or the 2004 amendments while including 
detailed language regarding tuition reimbursement, see 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10), 
despite the fact that courts had been awarding compensatory education in special 
education matters for more than twenty years. 
 208. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C)--(D) (2012). 
 209. See § 1415(b)(6), (f)(3)(C)--(D); see also Lynn M. Daggett et al., For Whom 
the School Bell Tolls but not the Statute of Limitations: Minors and the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 717, 722 (2005) (defining 
statutes of limitations as serving many purposes, including ‘‘imposing finality on the 
litigation system, giving potential defendants an end to their potential liability, and 
avoiding litigation of disputes involving stale evidence’’). 
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explicit time limitation for requesting such a hearing under this 
subchapter, in such time as the State law allows.210 
The Act delineates two exceptions to the timeline: 
(D) Exceptions to the timeline. The timeline described in 
subparagraph (C) shall not apply to a parent if the parent was 
prevented from requesting the hearing due to----- 
(i) specific misrepresentations by the local educational agency that it 
had resolved the problem forming the basis of the complaint; or 
(ii) the local educational agency’s withholding of information from 
the parent that was required under this subchapter to be provided to 
the parent.211 
Congress also amended the procedural safeguards section 
concerning the opportunity for a party to file a complaint, requiring 
that that states establish and maintain procedures including: 
(6) An opportunity for any party to present a complaint----- 
(A) with respect to any matter relating to the identification, 
evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of 
a free appropriate public education to such child; and 
(B) which sets forth an alleged violation that occurred not more 
than 2 years before the date the parent or public agency knew or 
should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of 
the complaint, or, if the State has an explicit time limitation for 
presenting such a complaint under this subchapter, in such time as 
the State law allows, except that the exceptions to the timeline 
described in subsection (f)(3)(D) shall apply to the timeline 
described in this subparagraph.212 
The new statutory language superseded the Third Circuit’s decision 
in Bernardsville Board of Education v. J.H.213 by creating a two-year 
statutory time limit on reimbursement filings.  It also overrode 
portions of the court’s earlier decision in Ridgewood214 by 
implementing a statute of limitations on the filing of compensatory 
education claims at the administrative level.  Litigation following 
implementation of this new provision initially focused on retroactive 
                                                                                                                 
 210. § 1415(f)(3)(C). 
 211. § 1415(f)(3)(D)(i)--(ii). 
 212. § 1415(b)(6). 
 213. 42 F.3d 149, 151 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 214. 172 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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application of the statute to claims arising prior to the IDEA 2004’s 
passage but filed after the Act’s effective date.215 
In the last few years, the focus of litigation in Third Circuit courts 
has shifted to the application of the statute of limitations to 
compensatory education claims and parsing out the provision’s 
exceptions.  These recent federal district and appellate court 
decisions, discussed in detail below, demonstrate courts’ confusion 
and resultant misapplication of the statute of limitations, and their 
overly restrictive interpretation of the exceptions.  The decisions 
further constrict the availability of compensatory education as a 
remedy, to the particular detriment of low-income children with 
disabilities, and exhibit an almost complete reversal in the Third 
Circuit’s prior broad approach to compensatory education claims. 
1. Application of the IDEA 2004’s Statute of Limitations 
In applying the IDEA 2004’s statute of limitations, Third Circuit 
courts err in two respects, both of which result in improper 
restrictions on the consideration of compensatory education claims.  
First, several courts misstate the statute of limitations as limiting 
compensatory education claims to actions that occurred no more than 
two years prior to the date the complaint was filed.216  Second, some 
courts, while properly tolling the statute of limitations from the date 
the plaintiff knew or should have known about the alleged action 
forming the basis of the complaint (hereinafter referred to as the 
‘‘knew or should have known’’ date or ‘‘KOSHK’’ date), erroneously 
restrict consideration of compensatory education claims to a 
maximum of two years prior to the KOSHK date, regardless of the 
actual scope and duration of the claim.217  The first restriction reflects 
a misreading of the statute, while the second reflects statutory 
                                                                                                                 
 215. See, e.g., Evan H. v. Unionville-Chadds Ford Sch. Dist., No. 07-4990, 2008 WL 
4791634 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2008) (concluding that the statute of limitations applies to 
claims filed after the Act’s effective date, even if based on actions occurring prior to 
the enactment of IDEA 2004).  In 2010 the Third Circuit resolved the retroactivity 
issue in Steven I. v. Central Bucks School District, holding that the statute of 
limitations applies to claims filed after the Act’s effective date for actions and 
violations occurring prior to the effective date. 618 F.3d 411, 412 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 216. See, e.g., H.M. ex rel. B.M. v. Haddon Heights Bd. of Educ., 822 F. Supp. 2d 
439, 446--47 (D.N.J. 2011); see also D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 244 (3d 
Cir. 2012); Munir v. Pottsville Area Sch. Dist., No. 3:10--cv--0855, 2012 WL 2194543, 
at *12 n.6 (M.D. Pa. June 14, 2012), aff’d, 723 F.3d 423 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 217. See, e.g., I.H. ex rel. D.S. v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 842 F. Supp. 2d 
762, 774 (M.D. Pa. 2012); see also G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., No. 2:13-
cv-00034, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180923, at *19--20 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2013). 
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misinterpretation and contravenes the plain meaning of the statute, 
the legislative history of the Act,218 and Third Circuit precedent. 
a. Courts Improperly Restrict Adjudication of Compensatory 
Education Claims to Two Years Prior to the Date the Complaint Was 
Filed 
As previously stated, the IDEA 2004’s statute of limitations, set 
forth at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C), requires a party to file a complaint 
within two years of the date the parent or public agency knew or 
should have known about the alleged action219 that forms the basis of 
the complaint.  Several courts, however, (in dicta) have misread § 
1415(f)(3)(C) together with § 1415(b)(6)(B) (procedural safeguard 
concerning the filing of a complaint) as barring courts from 
adjudicating any IDEA claims that occurred more than two years 
prior to the date the petition was filed.220  For example, in H.M. ex rel. 
B.M., v. Haddon Heights Board of Education, the court incorrectly 
states that because the plaintiffs filed their petition on June 5, 2008, 
they could seek recovery only for claims arising after June 5, 2006,221 
two years prior to the date of filing (as opposed to the KOSHK date).  
The court similarly errs in L.G. and E.G. ex rel. E.G. v. Wissahickon 
School District, stating, ‘‘Under IDEA’s amended statute of 
limitations, a court may consider alleged denials of a FAPE occurring 
for a two-year period prior to parents’ request for a due process 
                                                                                                                 
 218. See generally S. REP. NO. 108-185 (2003). 
 219. Courts define ‘‘action’’ as the date the plaintiff learned or should have learned 
of the injury, as opposed to the date the plaintiff knew the conduct of the school 
district was actionable. See, e.g., Centennial Sch. Dist. v. S.D. ex rel. Daniel D., No. 
10-CV-4129, 2011 WL 6117278, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2011) (finding the statute of 
limitations accrues on plaintiff’s knowledge of the injury and not plaintiff’s 
knowledge of the law); see also Bantum v. Sch. Dist., No. 10-4195, 2011 WL 1303312, 
at *4 n.7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 5, 2011) (‘‘[P]laintiff has two years from the date she learned 
or should have learned of her injury to request that the School District provide her 
with a due process hearing.’’). 
 220. See, e.g., H.M., 822 F. Supp. 2d at 446--47 (confirming that where plaintiffs 
filed their petition on June 5, 2008, they could seek recovery for claims that arose up 
to two years prior, i.e., June 5, 2006); see also D.K., 696 F.3d at 244 (noting that 
plaintiffs’ claims are restricted to conduct following January 8, 2006, two years prior 
to the January 8, 2008 date plaintiffs filed their initial due process petition); Munir, 
2012 WL 2194543, at *12 n.6 (noting that the court will not consider any claim arising 
prior to August 12, 2007 where the plaintiff filed the petition for due process on 
August 12, 2009); L.G. & E.G. ex rel. E.G. v. Wissahickon Sch. Dist., Nos. 06--0333, 
06--3816, 2011 WL 13572, at *7 n.5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2011) (‘‘Under IDEA’s amended 
statute of limitations, a court may consider alleged denials of a FAPE occurring for a 
two-year period prior to parents’ request for a due process hearing.’’). 
 221. See H.M., 822 F. Supp. 2d at 446--47 (barring consideration of testimony that 
supported claims predating two years prior to the date of filing). 
2013] A POOR IDEA 639 
hearing.’’222  Significantly, the Third Circuit, in D.K. v. Abington 
School District, reinforces this misreading of the statute when it 
states, ‘‘Plaintiffs do not dispute that because they requested a due 
process hearing on January 8, 2008, the statute of limitations 
generally would limit their claims to the School District’s conduct 
after January 8, 2006.’’223 
Even if the courts read § 1415(f)(3)(C) together with § 
1415(b)(6)(B), and interpreted the language as restricting 
adjudication of all compensatory education claims regardless of their 
scope or duration (a proposition that this Article does not advocate, 
except for illustrative purposes only), courts would have to consider, 
at the very least, all claims arising during the two years prior to the 
KOSHK date,224 not the date of filing the petition.225  To illustrate the 
distinction, consider a parent who learns of an ongoing FAPE 
violation causing harm to his child on January 1, 2010 (the KOSHK 
date) and the violation had occurred in a continuous manner for three 
years prior to that time.  If the parent files a complaint within the two-
year statute of limitations period (i.e., by January 1, 2012), he should 
be permitted to date the claim for compensatory education at least as 
far back as January 1, 2008, two years prior to the KOSHK date.  One 
court recently referred to this interpretation as the ‘‘2+2’’ analysis: 
‘‘[I]t allows two years after the KOSHK date for a plaintiff to file a 
due process complaint, and the period of up to two years before the 
KOSHK date for which [sic] plaintiffs may allege IDEA violations 
occurred,’’ allowing courts to consider, at most, a four-year IDEA 
claim.226  In contrast, according to the H.M. and L.G. opinions, the 
parent could date the claim back to January 1, 2010 only (two years 
prior to the date of filing), which would deprive the child of two 
additional years of compensatory education.  Although the courts’ 
                                                                                                                 
 222. L.G., 2011 WL 13572, at *7 n.5 (improperly stating the rule when discussing 
whether the IDEA’s statute of limitations replaces the equitable limitations imposed 
before 2004) (emphasis added); see also Munir, 2012 WL 2194543, at *12 n.6 (stating, 
in dicta, that the court will not consider any claim arising prior to August 12, 2007 
where the plaintiff filed the petition for due process on August 12, 2009). 
 223. D.K., 696 F.3d at 244. 
 224. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B) (2012). 
 225. The propriety of this strict interpretation, presented for hypothetical purposes 
only, is highly questionable, although at least one district court has followed this 
rationale. See, e.g., I.H. ex rel. D.S. v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 842 F. Supp. 2d 
762, 774 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (holding that plaintiff’s compensatory education claims 
arising before June 8, 2008 are barred where the parent’s ‘‘knew or should have 
known’’ date was found to be June 8, 2010). 
 226. See G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., No. 2:13-cv-00034, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 180923, at *10--11 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2013). 
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erroneous reading of the statute of limitations in these cases had no 
direct bearing on the resolution of the issues being litigated, it creates 
confusion and misleads other courts227 and the public.228 
b. Courts Improperly Restrict Adjudication of Compensatory 
Education Claims to Two Years Prior to the KOSHK Date 
Regardless of the Scope of the Claim 
Courts’ application of ‘‘2+2’’ analysis creates further confusion 
regarding the interrelationship of § 1415(f)(3)(C) and § 1415(b)(6)(B) 
and their application to compensatory education claims.  Relying on 
‘‘2+2’’ analysis, Third Circuit courts restrict consideration of 
compensatory education claims, and thus the scope of awards, to the 
two-year period prior to the KOSHK date, regardless of whether the 
claim began more than two years prior but was ongoing up to and 
during the two-year period and timely filed.229  As discussed below, 
these decisions contradict the plain meaning of the relevant statutory 
provisions, evince a misinterpretation of the statute, contravene the 
legislative history of the IDEA, and negate years of Third Circuit 
precedent. 
Lower courts in two recent cases misconstrue the interplay of § 
1415(f)(3)(C) and § 1415(b)(6)(B) as preventing courts from hearing 
any claims that predate the two-year period prior to the KOSHK 
date. In I.H. v. Cumberland Valley School District, the parent filed a 
petition, on August 25, 2010, seeking compensatory education for her 
child dating back to March 2007, three years prior.230  The hearing 
officer determined that the parent’s KOSHK date for purposes of the 
                                                                                                                 
 227. See, e.g., id. at *19--20 (concluding that the hearing officer made an error of 
law when it held plaintiff’s claims for relief were limited to the two years prior to the 
date the petition was filed, but certifying the issue for interlocutory appeal to the 
Third Circuit on the question of the proper statutory interpretation and application 
of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C) together with § 1415(b)(6)(B)).  Significantly, no other 
federal court of appeals has addressed this issue to date. 
 228. For example, in recent years the attorneys in the Education and Health Law 
Clinic have heard numerous mediators, administrative law judges and legal counsel 
for boards of education assert that a child cannot receive an award of more than two 
years of compensatory education under the statute of limitations, regardless of case 
circumstances. 
 229. See G.L., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180923, at *13--15; see also I.H., 842 F. Supp. 
2d at 773--74.  
 230. I.H., 842 F. Supp. 2d at 774 (limiting consideration of claims regarding the 
denial of a FAPE to those occurring for a two-year period prior to the parents’ 
KOSHK date). 
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statute of limitations was June 8, 2010,231 and thus limited the 
compensatory education claim to June 8, 2008, two years prior.232  The 
district court affirmed, reasoning that while § 1415(f)(3)(C) controls 
the limitations period for filing an action, § 1415(b)(6)(B) ‘‘provides a 
limitations period for the scope of the action, that is, which alleged 
violations or harms may be included in the complaint.’’233  The court 
in G.L. v. Ligonier Valley School District, guided by the I.H. decision, 
similarly concluded that § 1415(f)(3)(C) and § 1415(b)(6)(B) should 
be read separately, defining the former as a time limit on filing for a 
hearing, and the latter as a ‘‘look-back’’ period for purposes of 
liability.234  Both courts espouse that the two-year ‘‘limitations period 
for the scope of the action,’’235 or ‘‘look-back’’ period,236 precludes 
courts from adjudicating any IDEA claims for actions that occurred 
more than two years before the KOSHK date even if they were 
ongoing to the two-year period.237 
As explained above, § 1415(f)(3)(C) is the IDEA’s statute of 
limitations provision and sets a two-year timeline from the KOSHK 
date to request a hearing.  If a parent waits more than two years after 
the KOSHK date to request a hearing, and the opposing side raises 
the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, the court will 
time-bar the claim unless the parent meets one of the delineated 
exceptions.238  In contrast, § 1415(b)(6)(B) is found in the procedural 
safeguards section of the IDEA and details the content of a 
complaint.  Section 1415(b)(6)(B) provides, in relevant part, that any 
party may present a complaint alleging a violation that occurred not 
more than two years prior to the KOSHK date.239  Significantly, the 
plain language of § 1415(b)(6)(B) does not expressly limit the 
duration or scope of the claims, provided the complaint alleges a 
violation that occurred within the two-year period.  As such, if a 
timely filed complaint sets forth a violation that occurred in the two-
year period before KOSHK date, but the claim commenced prior to 
the two-year period and was ongoing, nothing in the language of the 
                                                                                                                 
 231. Id. (noting that the parties agreed that the date the parent had learned, from 
an independent evaluation paid for by the district, that the child was not receiving a 
FAPE was the ‘‘knew or should have known date’’). 
 232. See id. 
 233. Id. (emphasis added). 
 234. See G.L., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180923, at *13--15.   
 235. I.H., 842 F. Supp. 2d at 774. 
 236. G.L., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180923, at *13. 
 237. See id. at *14--15; see also I.H., 842 F. Supp. 2d at 774. 
 238. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C)--(D) (2012). 
 239. § 1415(b)(6)(B). 
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IDEA restricts courts from adjudicating the claim in its entirety.  To 
interpret the IDEA as foreclosing courts’ adjudication of such timely 
filed, ongoing claims defies the plain language of § 1415(b)(6)(B) 
even when read together with § 1415(f)(3)(C)--(D), and contradicts 
the legislative history of the Act (as discussed in greater detail below).  
Moreover, this interpretation, advanced by the I.H. and G.L. courts, 
creates a right without a remedy, in contravention to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s opinions in Burlington240 and, more recently, in 
Forest Grove School District v. T.A.241 
In defining § 1415(b)(6)(B) as a limitation on the scope or duration 
of claims, the I.H. and G.L. courts appear to interpret the provision 
not as an extension or restatement of the statute of limitations set 
forth in § 1415(f)(3)(C), but rather as a jurisdictional limitation on 
courts’ ability to hear IDEA claims.242  This distinction is critical. 
When a filing requirement is deemed jurisdictional, it cannot be 
modified, and plaintiff noncompliance with the requirement results in 
an absolute bar to consideration of the claims.243  In contrast, the 
Third Circuit considers a statute of limitations an affirmative defense 
and subject to equitable modifications.244 
To determine if a statutory provision is jurisdictional, courts look 
to congressional intent by considering the language, legislative 
history, and purpose of the statute.245  Factors considered include 
whether the provision explicitly uses the term ‘‘jurisdiction,’’ whether 
it appears in the same section as the statute of limitations or in the 
statutory section on jurisdiction, and whether it is subject to 
modification.246  Here, the two-year time limit in § 1415(b)(6)(B) 
                                                                                                                 
 240. See Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985) 
(explaining that ‘‘by empowering the court to grant ‘appropriate’ relief Congress 
meant to include retroactive reimbursement to parents as an available remedy’’ and 
to find other otherwise would make a ‘‘child’s right to a free and appropriate public 
education . . . less than complete.’’  
 241. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 238 (2009) (‘‘[A]bsent any 
indication to the contrary, what relief is ‘appropriate’ must be determined in light of 
the Act’s broad purpose of providing children with disabilities a FAPE . . . .’’); see 
also Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 527 (2007) (‘‘[T]he Act does 
not sub silentio or by implication bar parents from seeking to vindicate the rights 
accorded to them . . . . Through its provisions for expansive review and extensive 
parental involvement, the statute leads to just the opposite result.’’). 
 242. Notably, neither court addresses the jurisdictional issue directly. 
 243. See Miller v. N.J. State Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 617--18 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 244. See id. at 618. 
 245. See id. 
 246. See id.; see also Wall Twshp. Bd. of Educ. v. C.M., 534 F. Supp. 2d 487, 493 
(D.N.J. 2008). 
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appears to have ‘‘jurisdictional significance’’247 by virtue of its 
placement in the statute.  Nevertheless, this significance is diminished 
for several reasons.  First, Congress refers to the limitation as a ‘‘time 
limitation,’’248 not a jurisdictional limitation.  Second, the limitation 
does not appear in the section of the IDEA that confers jurisdiction 
on the courts, namely § 1415(i)(3).  Finally, and most importantly, § 
1415(b)(6)(B) permits states to disregard the two-year limit in favor 
of their own time prescriptions, undermining any arguments that 
Congress intended that the provision be jurisdictional.249  ‘‘Time 
prescriptions created by state laws cannot be jurisdictional because 
‘[o]nly Congress may determine a lower federal court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction.’’’250 Therefore, courts should accord the two-year time 
limit set forth in § 1415(b)(6)(B) no jurisdictional significance. 
 Since § 1415(b)(6)(B) cannot be considered jurisdictional, the 
purpose and significance of the provision remain in question.  Third 
Circuit courts in L.G. and D.K. refer generally to the ‘‘statute of 
limitations’’ as justification for restricting the scope of IDEA claims 
to two years prior to the date of filing the petition251 (courts’ incorrect 
tolling of the statute of limitations to the date of filing the petition is 
discussed at length above).  If Congress intended that courts treat § 
1415(b)(6)(B) as merely  a restatement of the statute of limitations set 
forth at § 1415(f)(3)(C), the time limit may be pled as an affirmative 
defense only, and cannot serve as a jurisdictional bar that limits the 
scope of claims.252  This interpretation of the statutory language 
                                                                                                                 
 247. See C.M., 534 F. Supp. 2d at 492. 
 248. See Miller, 145 F.3d at 618 (distinguishing between jurisdictional limitations 
and statutes of limitations). 
 249. C.f. C.M., 534 F. Supp. 2d at 493 (finding that the IDEA’s ninety-day appeals 
timeline set forth at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B) (2012) is not jurisdictional because the 
statute permits states to disregard the timeline and create their own, whereas only 
Congress may determine the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts). 
 250. Id. (citing Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 217 (2007)).  It should also be noted 
that the G.L. court’s reliance on other federal statutes, including look-back 
provisions, is misplaced, because Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, cited in 
G.L. as an example, has a look-back provision that cannot be modified by the states, 
whereas the IDEA provision at issue here can be so modified. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 
1415(b)(6)(B) (2012) (directing that state-imposed time limits for ‘‘presenting [a] 
complaint’’ supersede the two-year time limit delineated in the Statute), with 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2012) (directing that back-pay liability for employers, under 
Title VII, ‘‘shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a 
charge,’’ yet not allowing for consideration of state-imposed time restrictions). 
 251. See L.G. & E.G. ex rel. E.G. v. Wissahickon Sch. Dist., Nos. 06--0333, 06--
3816, 2011 WL 13572, at *7 n.5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2011). See generally D.K. v. 
Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 244 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 252. See Miller, 145 F.3d at 617--18. 
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coincides with the Third Circuit’s finding that statutes of limitation 
‘‘regulate secondary conduct, i.e., the filing of a suit, not primary 
conduct, i.e., the actions that gave rise to the suit.’’253   
While much of the language of § 1415(b)(6)(B) mimics § 
1415(f)(3)(C), supporting the statutory interpretation that the former 
provision merely restates the latter, some differences exist.254.  
Interestingly, in the first House Report proposing amendments to the 
IDEA as part of the 2004 reauthorization process, the only time limit 
on IDEA claims appears in the procedural safeguards section later 
codified in § 1415(b)(6)(B).255  The Report provides that states must 
have procedures including an opportunity to present complaints, 
which ‘‘set forth a violation that occurred not more than one year 
before the complaint is filed.’’256  In the comments to the Report, 
Congress refers to this new language as a ‘‘statute of limitations,’’ 
stating that ‘‘[t]he bill includes a statute of limitations of one year 
from the date of the violation.’’257  Thus, Congress appears to be 
stating the same proposition in two different ways-----a complaint must 
set forth a violation that occurred no more than one year prior to the 
date a parent files, and a parent must file a complaint within one year 
of the date of the violation. 
The later Senate Report adds specific statute of limitations 
language, subsequently codified in § 1415(f)(3)(C), and amends the § 
1415(b)(6)(B) language in what appears to be an attempt to make the 
two provisions consistent.258   In so doing, the Senate replaces the one-
year time limit referenced in the House Report with a two-year 
limit.259  The Senate also changes the date for tolling the statute of 
limitations from the date of filing a complaint to the KOSHK date.260  
                                                                                                                 
 253. Steven I. v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 618 F.3d 411, 414 n.7 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 254. Compare, e.g., § 1415(b)(6)(B) (‘‘The procedures required by this section shall 
include . . . an opportunity for any party to present a complaint . . . which sets forth an 
alleged violation that occurred not more than 2 years before the date the parent or 
public agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the 
basis of the complaint . . . .’’), with § 1415(f)(3)(C) (‘‘A parent or agency shall request 
an impartial due process hearing within 2 years of the date the parent or agency knew 
or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the 
complaint . . . .’’). 
 255. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-77, at 36 (2003). 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. at 116. 
 258. Compare S. REP NO. 108-185, at 40 (2003), with § 1415(f)(3)(C), and § 
1415(b)(6)(B).  
 259. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 108-77 at 36, with S. REP. NO. 108-185, at 40. 
 260. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 108-77 at 36 (2003), with § 1415(f)(3)(C), and § 
1415(b)(6)(B). 
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This change in the tolling date significantly alters the interrelationship 
of the two provisions.  To illustrate, requiring that the complaint set 
forth a violation that occurred no more than two years prior to the 
date of filing, and requiring that a complaint be filed within two years 
of the date a violation occurred, is to state the same two-year time 
limitation in different ways.  In contrast, requiring that a complaint 
set forth a violation that occurred no more than two years prior to the 
KOSHK, and requiring that a complaint be filed within two years of 
the KOSHK date, creates two potentially very different timeframes.261  
Notably, the Senate Report comments neither refer to § 
1415(b)(6)(B) nor define the provision’s purpose apart from their 
discussion of the statute of limitations in § 1415(f)(3)(C).262  This leads 
one to posit that Congress, when adding the language of § 
1415(f)(3)(C) and changing the date and time period for tolling in § 
1415(b)(6)(B) to coincide with § 1415(f)(3)(C), may have intended § 
1415(b)(6)(B) to serve as nothing more than a restatement (or 
elaboration) of, the statute of limitations, with no (or limited) 
separate weight or effect.263 
Courts’ confusion regarding the language and purpose of § 
1415(b)(6)(B) and its relationship with § 1415(f)(3)(C) provides a 
valid basis for examining the IDEA’s legislative history to ascertain 
Congress’s intent.264  The legislative history plainly reveals that 
Congress did not intend to limit the scope of ongoing compensatory 
education claims as long as such claims were timely filed: 
This new provision is not intended to alter the principle under 
IDEA that children may receive compensatory education 
services . . .  First, the statute of limitations will bar consideration of 
                                                                                                                 
 261. Compare § 1415(b)(6)(B) with § 1415(f)(3)(C). 
 262. See generally S. REP. NO. 108-185. 
 263.  See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 242 (2009) (finding that 
several statutory clauses within IDEA were not restrictive or exclusive and instead, 
were ‘‘best read as elaborating on the general rule that courts may order 
reimbursement when a school district fails to provide a FAPE by listing factors that 
may effect a reimbursement award.’’). 
 264. A court may examine the legislative history of a statute where the statutory 
language is inconclusive or ambiguous. See Carteret Sav. Bank, F.A. v. Office of 
Thrift Supervision, 963 F.2d 567, 578 (3d Cir. 1992) (examining the legislative history 
of the statute in question where the statutory language was found to be ‘‘not 
conclusive’’); see also United States ex rel. LaCorte v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical 
Labs., 149 F.3d 227, 233 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that the statute at issue was not 
ambiguous, and declining, therefore, to consider the legislative history behind the 
statute’s passage in the court’s opinion). But see G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. 
Auth., No. 2:13-cv-00034, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180923, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 
2013) (concluding that the plain meanings of § 1415(b)(6)(B) and § 1415(f)(3)(C) are 
clear such that the court need not examine statutory purpose or legislative history). 
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claims where: (1) the allegation relates to conduct or services that 
are more than two years prior to the commencement of due process 
on the basis of that conduct or those services, or upon the unilateral 
placement of the child in a private school or with a private service 
provider, and (2) during that two year period, either (a) the services 
are not alleged to have been at cost or inappropriate, or (b) the 
conduct is not alleged to have been appropriate. In essence, where 
the issue giving rise to the claim is more than two years old and not 
ongoing, the claim is barred; where the conduct or services at issue 
are ongoing to the previous two years, the claim for compensatory 
education services may be made on the basis of the most recent 
conduct or services and the conduct or services that were more than 
two years old . . . at the time of the due process or the private 
placement.265 
To illustrate the distinction between ‘‘2+2’’ analysis and what 
Congress intended, per the legislative history, consider again the 
example described above of the parent who learns of a FAPE 
violation causing harm to his child on January 1, 2010 (the KOSHK 
date), and seeks compensatory education as a remedy.  The violation 
commenced three years prior to the KOSHK date (on January 1, 
2007), and was ongoing for at least three years.  Following ‘‘2+2’’ 
analysis, the parent cannot pursue any claims for actions occurring 
more than two years prior to the KOSHK date.  As a result the child 
loses the right to an entire year of compensatory education.  
Following the legislative history of the IDEA, however, the parent 
can pursue claims for the full three years prior to the KOSHK date 
because the violation was ongoing up until and through the two-year 
period prior to the KOSHK date. 
The legislative history here coincides with Third Circuit precedent, 
as aptly expressed by the court in Robert R. v. Marple Newton School 
District: ‘‘[T]he limitations period placed on claims for compensatory 
education by the 2005 amendment to the IDEA was not meant to 
limit the period which the hearing officer could consider when a due 
process hearing was timely brought.’’266  Significantly, several lower 
courts in the Third Circuit reiterated this ‘‘broad approach to a child’s 
entitlement to compensatory education’’ claims267 in the years 
immediately following implementation of IDEA 2004, and again as 
                                                                                                                 
 265. S. REP. NO. 108-185, at 40 (2003) (emphasis added). 
 266. Robert R. v. Marple Newton Sch. Dist., No. Civ.A. 05-1282, 2005 WL 
3003033, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2005) (emphasis added); see also S. REP. NO. 108-
185, at 41 (supporting consideration of ongoing compensatory education claims as 
long as they are timely filed).  
 267. Id. 
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recently as 2013.268  Furthermore, the legislative history aligns with 
U.S. Supreme Court precedent barring restrictive interpretation of 
the IDEA where conflicting congressional intent exists,269 and 
mandating that parents have an adequate remedy to redress the 
denial of a FAPE.270 
Finally, Third Circuit courts’ recent decisions limiting the scope of 
compensatory education claims to the two years prior to the plaintiff’s 
KOSHK date271 negate years of precedent concerning the accrual of 
compensatory education claims.272  As discussed in Part II, the date 
that a school district knew or should have known of a FAPE violation 
determines when a compensatory education claim accrues, and is the 
starting point for measuring the claim’s scope or duration, i.e., the 
FAPE denial.273  More recent cases, however, erroneously shift the 
duty to identify a FAPE denial from school districts to parents (as 
plaintiffs).274  Consider the following example to better understand 
the effects of this shift.  If a school district knows or should have 
known of its failure to provide a FAPE to a student in 2007, but the 
                                                                                                                 
 268. See, e.g., Central Sch. Dist. v. K.C., Civil Action No. 11--6869, 2013 WL 
3367484, at *12 n.6 (E.D. Pa. July 3, 2013) (‘‘We also agree with the conclusion 
reached by several courts within this district, that the IDEA’s statute of limitations 
does not apply to limit the permissible period of compensatory educational 
awards.’’); Robert R., 2005 WL 3003033, at *4 (concluding that a parent’s due process 
claims seeking five years of compensatory education filed in June 2003 were not 
barred if timely brought, and citing five additional courts in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania as having adopted the reasoning that there is ‘‘no limitations period, 
whether equitable or legal, on a disabled child’s claim for compensatory education 
pursuant to the IDEA’’ (quoting Amanda A. v. Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., No. 
Civ.A. 04-4184, 2005 WL 426090, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2005))).  All of these cases, 
however, save one decision issued in 2013, involved the issue of retroactive 
application of the statute of limitations provision. 
 269. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 243--45 (2009).  
 270. See id.; see also Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 
(1985). 
 271. See, e.g., I.H. ex rel. D.S. v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 842 F. Supp. 2d 
762, 774 (M.D. Pa. 2012).  Other cases similarly espouse limiting compensatory 
education claims to two years from the date of filing the petition, but do not provide 
any support for these statements made in dicta. See D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 
F.3d 233, 244 (3d Cir. 2012); H.M. ex rel. B.M. v. Haddon Heights Bd. of Educ., 822 
F. Supp. 2d 439, 446--47 (D.N.J. 2011); L.G. & E.G. ex rel. E.G. v. Wissahickon Sch. 
Dist., Nos. 06--0333, 06--3816, 2011 WL 13572, at *7 n.5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2011). 
 272. See, e.g., Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 250 (3d 
Cir. 1999); see also M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Central Reg’l. Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 397 (3d 
Cir. 1996). 
 273. See Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 250 . 
 274. See e.g., I.H., 842 F. Supp. 2d at 774; see also G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. 
Dist. Auth., No. 2:13-cv-00034, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180923, at *13 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 
30, 2013). 
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parent does not learn of the action until 2011 (and timely files 
thereafter), the courts in Ridgewood and M.C. permit the parent to 
date the compensatory education claim all the way back to 2007.  In 
contrast, the courts in I.H. and G.L. preclude adjudication of any 
claims for violations that occurred more than two years prior to the 
plaintiff’s KOSHK date (limiting the claims in this example to 2009), 
and thereby deprive the student of two additional years of 
compensatory education.  By requiring parents to bear responsibility 
for identifying a FAPE violation, the courts absolve school districts of 
any and all duty to identify the failure to provide a FAPE.  Hence, 
courts tacitly encourage school districts not to share FAPE violations 
with parents, and improperly limit the scope of compensatory claims 
and awards, in contravention to seminal Third Circuit precedent.275 
In light of Congress’s clarity in the IDEA’s legislative history and 
relevant Third Circuit precedent, the courts clearly err in recent 
decisions by barring consideration of compensatory education claims 
that commenced more than two years prior to the parent’s KOSHK 
date without regard to case circumstances.  Perhaps the language of § 
1415(b)(6)(B), together with § 1415(f)(3)(C), confused the courts 
regarding the weight and effect, if any, to accord to the former 
provision.  Perhaps the nearly identical ‘‘knew or should have 
known’’276 language that appears in both the statutes of limitation and 
precedential Third Circuit opinions confounded the courts, leading 
them to conclude that the accrual analysis for compensatory 
education claims set forth in case precedent could not be reconciled 
with the language of the IDEA 2004 (a point with which this Article 
disagrees below in Part V).  Notwithstanding the courts’ reasoning, 
low-income children with disabilities who experience lengthy FAPE 
denials suffer the consequences of courts’ erroneous interpretations 
of this provision. 
                                                                                                                 
 275. See, e.g., Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 250; M.C., 81 F.3d at 396--97. 
 276. Any party has the opportunity to present a complaint setting forth ‘‘an alleged 
violation that occurred not more than 2 years before the date the parent or public 
agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis for 
the complaint . . . [subject to application of] the time line described in subsection 
(f)(3)(D).’’ 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B) (2012) (emphasis added).  This provision 
applies to the plaintiff in the action. Id.  According to Third Circuit precedent, a 
child’s right to compensatory education accrues from the point that the school district 
knows or should know of its failure to provide a FAPE. See M.C., 81 F.3d at 396--97; 
see also Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 250.  Thus, the starting point for measuring the 
duration of a FAPE denial and the corresponding scope of a compensatory education 
claim is when the school district knows or should have known of the violation. 
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2. Application of Equitable Tolling to the IDEA following the 2004 
Amendments 
In addition to the courts’ improper limitations on the consideration 
and duration of compensatory education claims, the Third Circuit in 
2012 further restricted the availability of compensatory education by 
ending use of equitable tolling in IDEA matters.277  Equitable tolling 
permits courts to postpone application of statutory limitations for a 
period of time under certain circumstances.278  These doctrines 
offered a means for plaintiffs to obtain lengthy compensatory 
education awards that otherwise may have been barred by strict 
(mis)application of the statute of limitations.279 
The Third Circuit banned two equitable tolling doctrines in 
particular: the continuing violations doctrine and statutory tolling for 
minors.280  The continuing violations doctrine applies where a 
defendant’s conduct is part of a ‘‘continuing practice.’’281  Under this 
doctrine, an action is considered timely ‘‘so long as the last act 
evidencing the continuing practice falls within the limitation period; 
in such instance, the court will grant relief for the earlier related acts 
that would otherwise be time barred.’’282  Statutory tolling for minors 
                                                                                                                 
 277. See D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 254 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 278. See, e.g., F.P. v. New Jersey, No. 00-2217(JWB), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25212, 
at *13 (D.N.J. June 28, 2001) (finding failure to provide a FAPE over time should be 
treated as an ongoing continuing practice); Jeffrey Y. v. St. Mary’s Area Sch. Dist., 
967 F. Supp. 852, 855 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (permitting application of the continuing 
violations doctrine to IDEA matters). But see J.L. v. Ambridge Area Sch. Dist., 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13451 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2008) (limiting exceptions to those found 
in the statute, thereby banning use of the continuing violations doctrine in IDEA 
matters). 
 279. The application of equitable tolling for minors and the continuing violations 
doctrine to special education cases is particularly critical for certain populations of 
children, e.g., children with disabilities in foster care, who routinely do not have 
someone serving as a ‘‘parent’’ to advocate on their behalves, despite surrogate 
parent appointment procedures in the Act. See Daggett et al., supra note 209, at 736, 
744 (discussing the critical role of parents in the special education process and 
recognition by Congress and the Supreme Court that ‘‘the IDEA’s effectiveness 
depends on parents’ involvement in their children’s special education, specifically 
including the exercise of the procedural safeguards assigned to them on behalf of 
their children’’); see also Jennifer Rosen Valverde, A New IDEA for Improving the 
Education of Children with Disabilities in Foster Care: Applying Social Work 
Principles to the Problem Definition Process, 26 CHILD. L. RIGHTS J. 14 (2006) 
(discussing educational challenges unique to children with disabilities in foster care, 
including those arising from the lack of a ‘‘parent’’ designee for special education 
purposes). 
 280. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 254. 
 281. See Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 927 F.2d 
1283, 1295 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 282. Id. 
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keeps the door open to relief for young people by delaying the 
application of time limits on filing until attaining the age of 
eighteen.283  In the IDEA context, statutory tolling for minors created 
a mechanism for young adults with disabilities, who were denied a 
FAPE prior to attaining the age of majority, to assert their own rights 
to compensatory education upon their eighteenth birthday.284 
In assessing the use of equitable tolling post-IDEA 2004, the Third 
Circuit examined the legislative history of the 2004 amendments to 
the IDEA as well as the regulatory history.285  The court found the 
history instructive on the question of whether equitable tolling 
doctrines apply: ‘‘[T]he legislative and regulatory history of the 2004 
amendments to the IDEA makes clear that only the enumerated 
statutory exceptions may exempt a plaintiff from having his claims 
time-barred by the statute of limitations.’’286  The court failed, 
however, to examine a critical section of the Congressional Record 
that distinguishes the continuing violations doctrine from other 
equitable tolling doctrines.287  The section overlooked by the court 
clearly expresses Congress’s intent to permit application of the 
                                                                                                                 
 283. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-21 (West 2000) (providing that the statute of 
limitations for minors tolls until the minor reaches the age of majority). 
 284. See, e.g., Wayne County Reg’l. Educ. Serv. Agency v. Pappas, 56 F. Supp. 2d 
807 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (tolling the statute of limitations for minor with a severe 
mental disability in a special education matter). But see Strawn v. Mo. State Bd. of 
Educ., 210 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding that tolling the statute of limitations for a 
minor frustrates the purpose of the IDEA).  The U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in 
Winkelman v. Parma that the IDEA affords separate and enforceable rights to 
parents and children offers further support for the application of minority tolling 
within the IDEA context. See 550 U.S. 516 (2007). 
 285. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 248.  Significantly, the court’s decision to examine the 
legislative history of the statute of limitations for this purpose opens the door to 
examining the legislative history for purposes of determining whether courts should 
limit the consideration and duration of ongoing compensatory education claims that 
are timely filed. 
 286. Id.  The court quotes Senate Report NO. 108-185 as stating, ‘‘The committee 
does not intend that common law determinations of statutes of limitations override 
this specific directive.’’ Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 108-185, at 40 (2003)).  The court also 
quotes the Federal Register as stating, ‘‘It is not necessary to clarify that common-law 
directives regarding statutes of limitations should not override the Act or State 
regulators timelines . . . because the Act and these regulations prescribe specific 
limitation periods which superseded common law directives in this regard.’’ Id. 
(quoting 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,697 (Aug. 14, 2006)).  The court fails to reconcile 
these statements with Congress’s prior assertion that ‘‘where the conduct or services 
at issue are ongoing to the previous two years, the claim for compensatory education 
services may be made on the basis of the most recent conduct or services and the 
conduct or services that were more than two years old at the time of due process or 
the private placement,’’ S. REP. NO. 108-185, at 40, which, some may argue, is 
identical to, and supporting application of, the continuing violations doctrine. 
 287. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 248. 
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continuing violations doctrine to timely filed compensatory education 
claims where such claims commenced prior to the two-years before 
the KOSHK date but were ongoing to that date.288  As a result, the 
court determined that plaintiffs cannot circumvent the statute of 
limitations by relying on equitable tolling doctrines available under 
state law.289 
The Third Circuit’s elimination of equitable tolling from the IDEA 
remedial repertoire ‘‘strips away the rights of children who were 
subject to systemic and long-term denials of FAPE and had parents 
who were not able or willing to assert their rights.’’290  Despite this 
effect, the Third Circuit determined that Congress never intended for 
these doctrines to ‘‘save claims otherwise foreclosed by the IDEA 
statute of limitations’’ and that the doctrine of expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of 
another) prevents their application.291  The court’s invocation of 
expressio unius in D.K. is flawed in two critical respects.  First, the 
doctrine typically applies where no contrary legislative intent exists,292 
while here, the legislative history of the IDEA reveals such contrary 
intent.293  Second, the doctrine’s application reads otherwise 
unexpressed limitations into the statute, in conflict with the Supreme 
Court’s broad approach to interpreting the IDEA, including the 
reading of its provisions as ‘‘elucidative rather than exhaustive.’’294  
Nevertheless, the court’s invocation of expressio unius to ban 
equitable tolling transformed the IDEA 2004’s two codified 
exceptions to the statute of limitations into a last savior of sorts.  
Unfortunately, the court’s extremely narrow interpretation of the 
exceptions makes them nearly impossible to satisfy, rendering them 
virtually useless for parents of children with disabilities and saving 
few. 
                                                                                                                 
 288. See S. REP. NO. 108-185, at 40.  
 289. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 248. 
 290. Hyman et al., supra note 92, at 132. 
 291. D.K., 696 F.3d at 248. 
 292. See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616--17 (1980) (‘‘Where 
Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional 
exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of contrary legislative intent.’’). 
 293. See supra notes 286--88 and accompanying text. 
 294. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 242 (2009). 
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3. The Third Circuit’s Interpretation of Exceptions to the Statute of 
Limitations 
The Third Circuit, in defining the exceptions to the IDEA 2004’s 
statute of limitations, foreclosed the last remaining avenues for 
children experiencing lengthy FAPE denials to obtain adequate 
awards of compensatory education.  As a result, the court cemented 
the second-class remedial status available to children living in poverty 
or low-income households under the IDEA. 
In interpreting the specific misrepresentations exception, the Third 
Circuit determined that plaintiffs ‘‘must show that the school 
intentionally misled them or knowingly deceived them regarding their 
child’s progress.’’295  The court reasoned that ‘‘in the absence of a 
showing of ‘misrepresentation’ akin to intent, deceit, or egregious 
misstatement, any plaintiff whose teachers first recommended 
behavioral programs or instructional steps short of formal special 
education might evoke the exception’’ which would essentially 
‘‘swallow the rule.’’296  The court further stated that a high threshold is 
necessary, for otherwise ‘‘mere optimism in reports of a student’s 
progress would toll the statute.’’297 
In the court’s attempt to counter one extreme-----that a school 
district professional’s ‘‘mere optimism’’ will successfully toll the 
statute-----it advanced the other extreme-----that a parent must show the 
misrepresentation was intentional.  Demonstrating ‘‘intentionality’’ 
requires a plaintiff to sufficiently prove the school district personnel’s 
subjective state of mind.298  Considering the fact that school districts 
are both the producers and the keepers of all evidence (i.e. school 
records), meeting this threshold is, at best, extremely difficult, and at 
worst, an impossible feat.  Following the Third Circuit’s rationale, a 
child’s teacher or service provider may offer an incomplete or 
inaccurate picture of a child, or gloss over a child’s failure to make 
progress, as long as he can show that it was unintentional and merely 
a display of hopefulness.  This excessively high standard also 
encourages school district personnel to base their opinions on 
                                                                                                                 
295. D.K., 696 F.3d at 246; see also Evan H. v. Unionville-Chadds Ford Sch. Dist., 
No. 07-4990, 2008 WL 4791634, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2008) (‘‘Plaintiffs must 
establish not that the District’s evaluations of the student’s eligibility under IDEA 
were objectively incorrect, but instead that the District subjectively determined that 
the student was eligible for services under the IDEA but intentionally 
misrepresented this fact to the parents.’’). 
 296. D.K., 696 F.3d at 24--46. 
 297. Id. at 245. 
 298. See id. at 245 (citing Evan H., 2008 WL 4791634, at *6 n.3). 
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subjective measures of progress, as opposed to objective ones.  
Without objective measures, a parent cannot challenge the 
subjectivity of a district’s opinions. 
With regard to the withholding of information exception, the court 
held that ‘‘only the failure to supply statutorily mandated disclosures 
can toll the statute of limitations,’’ and thus parents must show that a 
school district ‘‘failed to provide them with a written notice, 
explanation, or form specifically required by the IDEA statutes and 
regulations.’’299  As a result, a school district’s withholding of 
substantive information-----e.g., available programs, the student’s 
educational progress, teacher observations, and reports-----does not 
satisfy the rule. 
In addition to showing that the school district knowingly or 
intentionally misled the parent about the child’s progress, or that the 
district failed to provide the parent with the procedural safeguards or 
required notices, the parent must show causation.  Specifically, the 
parent must prove ‘‘that the misrepresentations or withholding caused 
his failure to request a hearing or filing a complaint on time.’’300  
Failure to do so results in denial of the exceptions. 
In comparing the Third Circuit’s interpretation of and approach to 
the IDEA’s remedial scheme pre and post-IDEA 2004, the 180-
degree shift becomes clear.  The court’s prior tendency to broadly 
construe the statute in favor of parents and children with disabilities 
has transformed into a constriction of rights and remedies at the 
expense of the very same children the Act aims to protect.  Children 
with disabilities whose families are socioeconomically disadvantaged 
have no choice in remedies and pay the price. 
IV.  APPLICATION OF THIRD CIRCUIT COURTS’ OPINIONS TO 
CASE STUDIES 
To illustrate the adverse effects of these decisions, this Article 
applies some of the Third Circuit’s recent positions on the statute of 
limitations to two anecdotal case studies301 from the Education and 
Health Law Clinic at Rutgers University School of Law-Newark 
(formerly known as the Special Education Clinic). 302  The Education 
                                                                                                                 
 299. Id. at 246. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Client names, identifying information, and certain case facts have been 
changed to protect client privacy and preserve confidentiality. 
 302. The Education and Health Law Clinic provides free legal representation to 
indigent parents of children with disabilities (and adult students) in special education, 
early intervention, and school discipline matters. In addition, through a new medical-
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and Health Law Clinic represented Aaron, an adult student, and the 
mother of Asia, a minor child, in their special education matters.  
These two cases represent a microcosm of thousands that go 
unheard303 due to many reasons, including parents’ lack of knowledge 
and awareness of available programs and services, eligibility 
requirements, their rights and those of their children, as well as lack 
of ability, confidence, and/or outside assistance in asserting their 
rights.304    
A. The Case of Aaron 
Consider first the case of Aaron, a nineteen-year-old male student 
with severe language and learning disabilities.  Aaron sought help 
from the Clinic because he was nearing graduation and wanted to 
learn how to read.  He found the Clinic with the help of a former 
public school teacher who had taken Aaron under her wing and tried 
to advocate on his behalf with the school district to obtain additional 
special education supports and services. When the former teacher 
                                                                                                                 
legal-social work partnership known as the H.E.A.L. (Health, Education, Advocacy 
and Law) Collaborative with the Rutgers-N.J. Medical School’s Outpatient Pediatrics 
Department, students in law and social work partner with medical professionals to 
address the legal and social needs of pediatric patients with disabilities and their 
families in an effort to improve overall child and family health and well-being.  
Demographically, the Clinic’s client population is comprised of parents and adult 
students who are predominantly African-American and Latino; some are new 
immigrants and speak limited or no English, whereas others have lived in the same 
urban poor communities for generations.  They are mostly female, and may be 
mothers, grandmothers, great-grandmothers, or aunts.  They frequently have their 
own histories of disabilities and/or current health concerns.  They have little to no 
money, as few are employed, and all have household incomes falling at or below 
150% of the federal poverty level, currently $35,325 per year for a family of four.  
They may face hunger and poor nutrition, deplorable housing conditions or 
homelessness, and may be forced to choose between paying for gas, electricity, food, 
or transportation on any given day.  For more information on the Rutgers School of 
Law Newark Education and Health Law Clinic, see Education and Health Law 
Clinic, RUTGERS SCH. L.-----NEWARK, http://law.newark.rutgers.edu/clinics/special-
education-clinic (last visited Dec. 18, 2013). 
 303. Other examples of case studies from the Education and Health Law Clinic 
involve children who are ‘‘suspended indefinitely’’ due to unaddressed emotional and 
behavioral disabilities; children who are profoundly deaf and have no verbal 
language, taught by teachers who know no sign language, and yelled at for not 
listening; children who are mislabeled and treated for attention deficit disorder and 
behavior problems when they actually suffer from severe auditory processing 
disabilities; children denied vision modifications or Braille instruction despite 
minimal light perception and legal blindness; or children placed on home instruction 
because no one at the school wants to take responsibility for maintaining their 
feeding tubes or administering seizure medications by injection. 
 304. See generally supra Part I. 
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reached a roadblock in her advocacy efforts, she contacted the Clinic 
for assistance. 
Aaron lived in a poor neighborhood in New Jersey.  He was a first-
generation American, and his parents, now divorced, immigrated to 
the United States from the Dominican Republic shortly before his 
birth.  His primary language at home is Spanish.  Although he lived at 
home with his mother and stepfather, his relationships with family 
members, except his younger brother, were so strained that he asked 
that all correspondence be sent to an alternate address.  Aaron’s 
mother and stepfather provided him with food and shelter; he paid 
for other expenses such as his cell phone and transportation by 
holding an after-school job stocking shelves. 
Aaron told the Clinic that he had received special education help 
all through his schooling, but could not name his classification or the 
services or programming he received.  When asked if his mother 
might know this information, he shook his head and explained that 
she spoke limited English, had a fifth grade education, and tended to 
sign papers without understanding them.  Aaron further described his 
father as ‘‘out of the picture’’ and remarked that his stepfather had 
nothing to do with his upbringing or schooling. 
Aaron characterized his greatest concerns as his difficulty 
understanding others when they talk and his inability to read.  School 
records provided by his teacher/advocate indicated that he was 
classified as Multiply Disabled305 due to unspecified specific learning 
disabilities306 and a communication impairment.307  Despite the 
IDEA’s requirement that students with disabilities be reevaluated for 
eligibility every three years,308 the school district had not evaluated 
Aaron since age thirteen.  Prior testing indicated that when he was in 
                                                                                                                 
 305. Under New Jersey Special Education Regulations, ‘‘multiply disabled’’ is 
defined as the ‘‘presence of two or more disabling conditions, the combination of 
which causes such severe educational needs that they cannot be accommodated in a 
program designed solely to address one of the impairments.’’ N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 
6A:14-3.5(c)(6) (West, Westlaw through Dec. 2013). 
 306. New Jersey Special Education Regulations define ‘‘specific learning disability’’ 
as, ‘‘a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in 
understanding or using language, spoken or written, that may manifest itself in an 
imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or to do mathematical 
calculations, including conditions such as perceptual disabilities, brain injury, minimal 
brain dysfunction, dyslexia, and developmental aphasia.’’ N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:14-
3.5(c)(12). 
 307. New Jersey Special Education Regulations define ‘‘communication 
impairment’’ as a disorder of language in the areas of ‘‘morphology, syntax, semantics 
and/or pragmatics/discourse’’ adversely affecting the student’s educational 
performance.  N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:14-3.5(c)(4). 
 308. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:14-3.8(a) (West, Westlaw through Dec. 2013). 
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the seventh grade, he read at a first grade level; however, more recent 
teacher reports placed his reading abilities at a third or fourth grade 
level. 
The Clinic immediately requested, and the school district agreed to 
provide, independent evaluations in the areas of speech and language, 
auditory processing, and reading as well as educational and 
psychological testing.  Results indicated that Aaron had a low average 
to near borderline IQ, a severe auditory processing disorder,309 a 
severe expressive and receptive language disorder,310 and a reading 
disability.  He performed at a second to third grade level in testing in 
most subjects, with the exception of reading, in which he performed at 
a first grade level.  A review of Aaron’s school records obtained from 
the district revealed, among other concerns, IEP goals and objectives 
that had been cut and pasted from one year to the next with no 
indicia of progress; unexplained termination of speech and language 
services when he was ten years old; failure to provide specialized 
reading instruction to address his decoding disability; and no 
accommodations, modifications, or assistive technology to assist 
Aaron with his auditory processing deficits. 
On Aaron’s behalf, the Clinic attended an IEP meeting with the 
school district to discuss his concerns.  When the district refused to 
address them, the Clinic filed a petition for a due process hearing311 on 
Aaron’s behalf; as a nineteen-year-old, Aaron had the right to sue on 
his own, and satisfied the statute of limitations by filing his complaint 
within two years of his eighteenth birthday, the earliest time at which 
he could be deemed to ‘‘know or should have known’’ of the action 
forming the basis of his complaint.312  Over the next six months, the 
                                                                                                                 
 309. An ‘‘auditory processing disorder’’ is a  ‘‘difficulty in the perceptual processing 
of auditory information in the central nervous system’’ (i.e., dysfunction in the way 
the brain processes auditory information as opposed to deafness or hearing 
impairment that concern how one hears information), resulting in language and 
learning difficulties. See (Central) Auditory Processing Disorders AM. SPEECH-
LANGUAGE-HEARING ASSOCIATION, http://www.asha.org/docs/html/tr2005-00043. 
html#sec1.3 (last visited Dec. 18, 2013). 
 310. An ‘‘expressive language’’ disorder is characterized by difficulties with the 
expression of language, including the sharing of thoughts, emotions, and ideas, 
whereas a ‘‘receptive language disorder’’ is characterized by difficulty understanding 
others. See Speech and Language Disorders and Diseases, AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGE-
HEARING ASSOCIATION, http://www.asha.org/public/speech/disorders (last visited 
Dec. 18, 2013). 
 311. See supra note 123 (detailing a ‘‘due process hearing’’). 
 312. Following Third Circuit courts’ definition of the ‘‘action forming the basis of 
the complaint,’’ Aaron’s KOSHK date likely would have been found as the date he 
received the results of the independent evaluations and learned of the injury. See 
generally supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
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Clinic engaged in active negotiations with the district to obtain a new 
educational program and an acceptable compensatory education 
settlement.  For leverage, the Clinic used the district’s nine-plus year 
failure to identify the denial of a FAPE and failure to provide 
appropriate programming and services to Aaron (using the date on 
which the district terminated speech and language services as the 
accrual date for the compensatory education claim). Additionally, the 
Clinic relied on New Jersey’s tolling provision for minors, which 
allowed the time limit for filing a complaint to be tolled until Aaron 
reached the age of majority, and the continuing violations doctrine, 
which permitted Aaron to date his claim back for multiple years 
during which the district’s conduct was ongoing.   The Clinic also 
couched its legal argument in the Third Circuit’s broad interpretation 
of the remedial scheme, especially as it applied to the remedy of 
compensatory education, evidenced in case precedent.313 
In the end, the parties settled, without litigation, on six years of 
extensive compensatory education and related services for Aaron.  
These services included a specialized reading program provided one-
on-one by a certified reading specialist up to four times per week, 
weekly individualized speech and language therapy, daily basic skills 
instruction taught one-on-one by a certified special education teacher, 
up to four years of college or post-high school vocational 
programming of his choosing at the district’s expense (including the 
cost of all materials, transportation, and other fees), assistive 
technology, and more.  Despite the extensive settlement Aaron 
received, based on research, no amount of compensatory education 
could ever place him into the position he would have been in had the 
district provided Aaron with proper programming and services all 
along.  To date, Aaron has advanced to a near fifth grade level in 
math, a near sixth grade level in reading, completed a trade school 
program of his choosing  (at the district’s expense), and obtained the 
necessary certification to practice his new vocation. 
Had Aaron’s case occurred today, the result would have differed 
greatly.  Aaron would have received two years of compensatory 
education programming and services following the courts’ language in 
H.M.,314 L.G.,315 and D.K.,316 or between three and four years 
                                                                                                                 
 313. See generally supra Part II.B. 
 314. See H.M. ex rel. B.M. v. Haddon Heights Bd. of Educ., 822 F. Supp. 2d 439, 
446--47 (D.N.J. 2011). 
 315. See L.G. & E.G. ex rel. E.G. v. Wissahickon Sch. Dist., Nos. 06--0333, 06--
3816, 2011 WL 13572, at *7 n.5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2011). 
 316. See D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 244 (3d Cir. 2012). 
658 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. 41 
following ‘‘2+2’’ analysis.317  Aaron likely would have stopped 
receiving his regular (non-compensatory) special education 
programming during the year he turned twenty-one, and would have 
exited from the special education system with a third to fourth grade 
reading level and high third grade math level at most.318  Based on 
these levels, he likely would not have been able to understand his 
teachers’ oral instructions in the vocational program, or been able to 
read and understand the materials needed to complete the program 
and obtain his certification.  Aaron probably would have ended up 
another poverty statistic, as opposed to an employed, contributing 
member of society.  While one may try to minimize the significance of 
Aaron’s case by arguing that it is merely an anomaly, from my years 
of experience in the field, I can say that I have seen similar facts in at 
least ten percent of my cases.  Moreover, for every case that the Clinic 
accepts, there are countless others that never see the light of day. 
B. The Case of Asia 
Asia’s situation differed greatly from Aaron’s, but also is not 
uncommon.  Her mother, Ms. Jones, first approached the Clinic when 
Asia was a twelve-year-old, sixth grade student in an urban public 
school.  When we met, Ms. Jones said that she knew ‘‘in her bones’’ 
that Asia was not receiving the educational programming and services 
she needed, but could not articulate why she felt that way.  Ms. Jones 
confided that she had trusted the school district for nearly six years, 
believing teachers and staff when they said Asia was receiving the 
non-special education supports she needed.  She admitted that, until 
recently, she did not know that she could ‘‘go after’’ the school district 
for refusing to educate Asia properly.  When asked if she ever 
received a copy of her special education rights from the district (i.e. 
procedural safeguards), she said she recalled receiving a booklet but 
did not understand much of what it said. 
Asia’s early history was significant. Her biological mother was a 
drug addict and had received no prenatal care. Asia was born seven 
weeks premature, with crack-cocaine in her system.  She experienced 
withdrawal symptoms following birth and spent her first eight weeks 
in the neonatal intensive care unit.  Ms. Jones, at age sixty, adopted 
Asia at age two.  Over the years, doctors diagnosed Asia with 
                                                                                                                 
 317. See G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., No. 2:13-cv-00034, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 180923, at *10--11 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2013). 
 318. These numbers are extrapolated from Aaron’s performance and progress 
reports following receipt of compensatory education and related services. 
2013] A POOR IDEA 659 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder319, Bipolar Disorder320, and 
Oppositional Defiant Disorder.321  Her behaviors and moods ranged 
widely, from calm and kind to manic episodes during which she 
engaged in uncontrolled fits of crying and screaming and, at times, 
destroyed property.  Doctors had not yet been able to determine the 
appropriate mix of pharmaceutical and therapeutic interventions to 
help her. 
Ms. Jones first requested help for Asia from the school district 
when she was six years old due to her out-of-control behaviors both at 
school and at home.  The school district had contacted Ms. Jones 
often over the years for Asia’s misbehavior, and alternated between 
suspending Asia and requiring that Ms. Jones accompany Asia to 
school and sit next to her in the classroom for weeks on end to ensure 
that she behaved.  However, the district never put the suspension 
notices in writing.  Later, when the Clinic asked about the district 
requiring Ms. Jones to accompany Asia to school, the district 
responded that Ms. Jones did so voluntarily and at her own initiative. 
The district rejected Ms. Jones’ initial request for non-specific help 
on the grounds that the timing of the request fell at the end of the 
school year and no teacher had expressed concerns about Asia.  At 
the end of the following school year, when Asia was seven, Ms. Jones 
again asked for help, but the district told her that since Asia’s 
problems were behavioral in nature, there was nothing they could do.  
Instead, they advised Ms. Jones to get Asia therapy outside of school, 
to which Ms. Jones agreed. 
During this time, Ms. Jones lost her job due to the numerous calls 
she received from Asia’s school during work hours and missed days 
resulting from accompanying Asia to school or removing Asia from 
school at the district’s behest.  In the months that followed, Ms. Jones’ 
own health began to deteriorate-----she became depressed and gained 
                                                                                                                 
 319. Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is a chronic condition 
affecting one’s ability to sustain attention and resulting in hyperactivity and impulsive 
behavior. See Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) in Children, MAYO 
CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/adhd/DS00275 (last visited Dec. 18, 2013). 
 320. Bipolar disorder, formerly known as manic depression, is a mental illness that 
is characterized by episodic high and low moods. See Bipolar Disorder, WEBMD, 
http://www.webmd.com/bipolar-disorder/mental-health-bipolar-disorder (last visited 
Dec. 18, 2013). 
 321. Oppositional Defiant Disorder is ‘‘a condition in which a child displays an 
ongoing pattern of uncooperative, defiant, hostile, and annoying behavior toward 
people in authority.  The child’s behavior often disrupts the child’s normal daily 
activities, including activities within the family and at school.’’ Oppositional Defiant 
Disorder, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/mental-health/oppositional-defiant-
disorder (last visited Dec. 18, 2013). 
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weight, thus aggravating her diabetes, and she developed high blood 
pressure and other health-related concerns.  These health concerns 
impacted her ability to find employment, and she soon found herself 
in debt and in danger of eviction.  She began relying on public 
assistance, including SSI for Asia and food stamps to pay for their 
basic needs. They were forced to move, resulting in an inter-district 
change of schools for Asia. 
At the new school, when Asia was ten, Ms. Jones asked for help 
again. This time, she was sent to the school’s Intervention and 
Referral Services (I&RS) team to discuss possible interventions.  The 
I&RS team met with Ms. Jones and they agreed to try different 
behavioral interventions, including a point system, to rectify the 
behaviors.  Six months passed with no change, so Ms. Jones and the 
I&RS team together referred Asia for a special education (child study 
team) evaluation.  A meeting was held, at which time members of the 
district’s special education department informed Ms. Jones that they 
would not evaluate Asia because the I&RS interventions had not 
been implemented fully and the I&RS documentation was 
incomplete.  At the same time, the district assured Ms. Jones that 
I&RS was resolving the problem behaviors and there was no need for 
special education assistance.  Over the next eighteen months, Ms. 
Jones bounced back and forth between the I&RS team and the child 
study team as she tried to work with them and do what they asked 
and instructed her to do, to no avail.  She contacted the Clinic for 
help after learning about us from Asia’s therapist in the after-school 
behavioral program. 
Within two months of the Clinic’s involvement, the district, at the 
Clinic’s urging, completed an expedited evaluation of Asia and found 
her eligible for special education and related services.  Testing 
revealed that Asia, then twelve years old, had an average to low 
average IQ, but was performing academically at approximately a 
third grade level across the board.  Shortly before a meeting with the 
school district to determine Asia’s eligibility for special education, she 
was hospitalized in an inpatient psychiatric unit due to ‘‘explosive’’ 
behavior.  A dispute then arose between the district and Ms. Jones 
over the proper classification for Asia, which further delayed the 
eligibility process for another two months.  When the parties finally 
agreed to a classification, the school district developed an IEP that 
proposed placement at another public school in the same town-----the 
same one Asia had attended previously.  Ms. Jones refused to agree 
to the IEP because she felt that this school could not address Asia’s 
needs appropriately. 
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The Clinic, on behalf of Ms. Jones, then filed a request for a due 
process hearing against the school district. The petition asked for 
Asia’s immediate placement in a private school specializing in 
educating children with severe emotional and behavioral problems, 
and compensatory education and related services due to the district’s 
failure to identify, evaluate, classify, and provide Asia with proper 
educational programming and services over a six-year period.  Shortly 
thereafter, Asia was again admitted to the crisis unit at the local 
hospital.  This time, the state’s behavioral health program stepped her 
down into a residential program, where Asia remains to this day. 
The parties ultimately settled Asia’s case without having to 
proceed to a hearing.  During negotiations, the Clinic relied on Third 
Circuit precedent placing the duty to identify the denial of a FAPE on 
school districts and the courts’ authority to award broad relief in the 
area of compensatory education where the violation was ongoing.  
The Clinic also relied on the exceptions to the statute of limitations 
provision to justify Ms. Jones’s failure to file for due process earlier.  
First, the Clinic argued that that the child study team’s repeated 
assertions that I&RS interventions were properly addressing Asia’s 
behavior problems induced Ms. Jones to trust that the district was 
providing Asia with the educational supports and services she 
required.  Second, the Clinic asserted that the district withheld 
necessary information from Ms. Jones about Asia’s failure to make 
educational progress and her non-responsiveness to I&RS 
interventions.  The parties ultimately agreed to a substantial 
compensatory education settlement allowing Asia to access additional 
educational programming and services up to and beyond age twenty-
one. 
Just as with Aaron’s case, had Asia’s matter arisen today, the 
settlement size would have been vastly reduced.  Earlier Third Circuit 
precedent and the exceptions to the statute of limitations served as 
valuable, essential bargaining chips for the Clinic in negotiating the 
settlement’s terms.  Although one cannot predict the future, it 
appears that no matter the breadth of the compensatory education 
award, Asia will not be put in the same position in which she would 
have been had the school district properly identified and addressed 
her behavioral concerns and their adverse impact on her education 
from the outset.  However, the Third Circuit’s recent restrictions on 
the availability of compensatory education as a remedy would have 
hurt her even more. 
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V.  REMEDYING INEQUALITIES IN THE REMEDIAL SCHEME 
Courts in the Third Circuit, through misreading, misstatements, 
misapplication, and restrictive interpretation of the statute of 
limitations, its exceptions, and the procedural safeguards have 
fortified the second-class status of the IDEA remedial scheme for 
children from low-income households.  The question of how to 
address this issue remains.  The statistics presented in Part I 
demonstrate that the proper education of children with disabilities in 
low-income households is a complex issue requiring a multi-faceted 
response.  Moreover, as stated previously, significant efforts must be 
made to cure the ills at the front end of the system for, until this 
occurs, the disheartening outcomes will not change.  In the interim, 
however, we must strengthen available remedies for low-income 
children with disabilities denied a FAPE.  To this end, I have several 
recommendations. 
First and foremost, Congress must codify the remedy of 
compensatory education in the next reauthorization322 of the Act. 323  
Without such codification, school districts have no duty to notify the 
public of the remedy’s availability, which results in the denial of 
essential information to an entire class of people for whom 
compensatory education and related services is the only form of 
recompense.  Congress’s continuing failure to codify compensatory 
education and to delineate parameters for accessing, interpreting, and 
applying the remedy, has reinforced the remedy’s status as a second-
class cure.324 
To illustrate, by including tuition reimbursement in the Act, 
Congress set forth the right to the remedy as well as the limitations on 
accessing and enforcing it.   In this manner, Congress protects both 
parents and school districts.  Parents must abide by notice 
                                                                                                                 
 322. The IDEA originally was scheduled for reauthorization in 2011 but the 
process has been postponed to at least 2014. See NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N, 
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITY EDUCATION ACT (IDEA): EARLY PREPARATION FOR 
REAUTHORIZATION (2013), available at http://www.nsba.org/Advocacy/Key-Issues/ 
SpecialEducation/NSBA-Issue-Brief-Individuals-with-Disabilities-Education-Act-
IDEA.pdf. 
 323. See Hyman et al. supra note 92, at 156 (recommending codification of 
compensatory education as a remedy in the statute to ensure that parents without 
means are aware of this remedial option). 
 324. One may posit that since compensatory education is an equitable remedy, it 
need not be codified as it falls under the IDEA’s broad remedial relief.  However, the 
same may be said about tuition reimbursement, also an equitable remedy, yet 
codified within the Act.  Perhaps the distinction exists because those who can afford 
to unilaterally place children in private schools have a louder voice in Congress than 
those who cannot front the costs, but that topic is outside the purview of this Article. 
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requirements and behave reasonably or else risk reduction or denial 
of reimbursement.  Similarly, school districts are on notice that 
parents know of the remedy and will use it when they are financially 
able.  Codification of tuition reimbursement serves as a valuable 
deterrent by placing school districts, particularly those in communities 
where parents can afford to ‘‘front’’ the costs of programs and 
services, on notice of substantial financial risk in the event they fail to 
provide a FAPE.  The IDEA also details certain instances where a 
court must or may be prevented from reducing or denying a tuition 
reimbursement claim,325 thereby adding an additional level of 
protection to parents who invoke the remedy. 
In contrast, the Act affords parents no notice of the availability of 
compensatory education as a remedy, nor does it offer parents 
seeking this remedy any additional protections.  Yet, the IDEA does 
impose requirements on parents for accessing and using the remedy.  
By applying the IDEA 2004’s statute of limitations provision to 
compensatory education claims, Congress sets rules on how to 
request a form of relief, and limits access to the relief without 
informing the public of the remedy’s availability or providing any 
guidance regarding what it is and how to obtain it.  In essence, 
Congress limits the remedy without stating it exists, which is akin to 
putting the proverbial cart before the horse.  One easily can see how 
this might result in children being denied the full benefit of the 
remedy due to a parent’s failure to invoke the remedy within required 
timelines. 
In addition to codifying the remedy of compensatory education, 
Congress should create a separate statute of limitations for these 
claims.  The current two-year statute of limitations on tuition 
reimbursement claims makes sense.  Logic dictates that parents 
should give school districts proper notice of their intent to unilaterally 
place their child and seek reimbursement, and two years is ample 
time for them to file for reimbursement from the district.  Clearly, 
parents know when they unilaterally place their children in private 
school.  Thus, the ‘‘should have known’’ language of the provision has 
limited or no application to tuition reimbursement claims.  Moreover, 
parents who are able to bear the costs of educational programs and 
                                                                                                                 
 325. See 20 USC §1412(a)(10)(C) (2012) (e.g., where a school district prevents a 
parent from providing required notice or parents do not receive notice/procedural 
safeguards from the school district).  Courts also may choose not to reduce or deny 
reimbursement where a parent is illiterate, cannot write in English, or compliance 
with notice requirements would have resulted in serious emotional harm to the child. 
See id. 
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services typically are financially stable, better educated, and more 
capable of understanding the IDEA’s procedural safeguards.326  These 
factors, coupled with the presumption that parents who unilaterally 
place their children in private school are more able to access and pay 
for legal assistance, make the two-year limitations period even more 
reasonable.  In contrast, as stated earlier, approximately two-thirds of 
children with disabilities live in households that qualify as (or are just 
over) low-income and are at high risk of experiencing the myriad 
harmful effects of the correlation between low socioeconomic status, 
disability and poor educational outcomes.327  These are the same 
children for whom compensatory education is the sole available 
remedy for the denial of a FAPE.  They are more likely to reside in 
single-parent households,328 and suffer the ill effects of power 
imbalances between their parents and their school districts resulting 
from differences in educational attainment, knowledge base, language 
and access to legal or other expert assistance.329   To impose a flat two-
year limitation on these parents when filing for compensatory 
education, without informing them of the remedy and offering an 
opportunity for courts to consider the factors discussed in Part I that 
influence parents’ ability to access the remedy and advocate, is to 
deprive them of adequate, equal recourse. 
In creating the statute of limitations for compensatory education 
claims, Congress should set a time limit that offers both a bright line 
rule to protect school districts and flexibility to protect parents of 
children with disabilities and adult students.  To accomplish this task, 
this Article proposes that Congress establish a two-year statute of 
limitations for the filing of compensatory education claims triggered 
solely by the date the parent knows of the alleged action that forms 
the basis of the complaint.330  In so doing, Congress could include a 
                                                                                                                 
 326. See generally supra Part I. 
 327. See WAGNER ET AL., supra note 11. 
 328. See Bradshaw, supra note 30; see also Fujiura & Yamaki, supra note 69. 
 329. See generally supra Part I.D. 
 330. Courts in the Third Circuit do not appear to have struggled with identifying 
the point at which a parent ‘‘knew’’ of the conduct, as in some cases parents and 
school districts agree on this date, and in others courts have defined the date as when 
the parent obtained legal representation or obtained the results of an independent 
evaluation that revealed a contrary view than that espoused by the District. See, e.g., 
I.H. ex rel. D.S. v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 842 F. Supp. 2d 762, 774  (M.D. Pa. 
2012) (finding that the ‘‘knew or should have known date’’ for requesting a hearing 
was the date the guardian learned, from independent evaluations, that the child was 
not receiving proper educational services); see also Lauren G. v. W. Chester Area 
Sch. Dist., 906 F. Supp. 2d 375, 387 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (finding that parents knew of 
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rebuttable presumption of knowledge in certain situations, which 
parents could produce evidence to overcome, to avoid the potential 
for needless litigation over the rule’s application.  Examples of such 
situations include where a parent retained the assistance of legal 
counsel for the explicit purpose of pursuing a case against the school 
district for the denial of a FAPE, or a parent obtained the results of 
independent evaluation reports indicating that the child’s current 
special education programming and services are not appropriate.331  
Elimination of the ‘‘should have known’’ requirement coincides with 
the minimal (to non-) use of that triggering language in the tuition 
reimbursement context.  Moreover, until the courts succeed in 
developing a ‘‘reasonable person standard’’ that applies to parents of 
low-income children with disabilities and incorporates those factors 
discussed in Part I, courts should refrain from making any 
determination of whether a parent ‘‘should have known’’ of the 
alleged action or violation. 
The inclusion of a new exception exempting from the time limit 
parents who know of the action forming the basis of the complaint, 
but demonstrate that circumstances otherwise impeded timely filing, 
is critical to this proposed statute of limitations.  To this end, 
Congress should mandate the development of uniform regulations 
that provide a non-exhaustive list of factors a court may consider in 
determining whether this new exception applies to a particular case.  
Factors should include a parent’s socioeconomic status, level of 
educational attainment, disability and health status, literacy and 
comprehension levels, native language issues, cultural norms (e.g. in 
certain cultures, teachers are given the utmost respect and their 
opinions are not challenged), access to outside expertise and legal 
representation, and the readability of the procedural safeguards, to 
name a few.  Congress should instruct courts to conduct an 
individualized inquiry into the application of this exception, including 
the parent’s unique factual circumstances, just as courts do in 
determining the appropriateness of a child’s IEP.  This exception to 
the rule is essential to protect children where a parent, due to 
circumstances beyond his control, is unable to file in a timely fashion.  
In addition to this exception, Congress should extend application of 
the IDEA 2004’s statute of limitations’ exceptions to compensatory 
education claims, but issue guidance on defining and applying the 
                                                                                                                 
injury at or about the time they removed their child from school and retained legal 
counsel for purposes of determining if the special education harm was actionable). 
 331. See, e.g., id. 
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exceptions to avoid and overcome the Third Circuit’s excessively 
restrictive interpretation. 
Once Congress codifies the remedy of compensatory education in 
the IDEA, the proposed separate statute of limitations, and 
exceptions, it must safeguard the scope of this remedy from 
restriction, provided a complaint is timely filed.  In other words, 
Congress should include its intent (which was consistent with prior 
Third Circuit precedent) within the language of the IDEA proper.  
Specifically, the IDEA should be amended to permit consideration of 
compensatory education claims that occurred more than two years 
before the KOSHK date, but were ongoing to the two-year period 
prior to that date, as long as such claims are filed in accordance with 
time limits.  Congress also should expressly permit the use of 
equitable tolling, including the continuing violations doctrine (in 
accordance with the legislative history) and statutory tolling for 
minors.  Disallowing consideration of ongoing compensatory 
education claims and the use of statutory tolling for minors penalizes 
children with disabilities for their parent’s circumstances in 
contravention to Third Circuit precedent.332  It perpetuates the vicious 
cycle of poor statistical outcomes for low-income children with 
disabilities and provides a green light to school districts to deny 
children a FAPE because of the unlikelihood they will be challenged 
for so doing, and the small amount of recompense they will have to 
provide (at most, two years) if such challenge succeeds. 333 
Finally, as we await the reauthorization process to make the above-
described changes to the statute, Third Circuit courts should 
reexamine recent opinions applying the IDEA 2004 statute of 
limitations to compensatory education matters and interpreting the 
exceptions together with the Act’s legislative history and Third 
Circuit precedent.  In the coming months, the Third Circuit will have 
                                                                                                                 
 332. See, e.g., M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Central Reg’l. Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 397 (3d Cir. 
1996). (‘‘[A] child’s entitlement to special education should not depend upon the 
vigilance of the parents . . . .’’). 
 333. School districts likely will argue that the flexibility provided in the proposed 
statute of limitations will open the door to excessive litigation and expose school 
districts to tremendous costs.  In reality, however, fewer than one percent of students 
receiving IDEA services participated in full hearings in 2008--2009, and considering 
the issues discussed in Part I, it is highly unlikely that these numbers will change 
greatly in the near future without significant changes in these circumstances. See 
Hyman et al., supra note 92, at 120 (noting that only 2033 of the nearly seven million 
children receiving special education services through Parts B and C of the IDEA 
actually participated in full hearings leading to a final decision in 2008--2009, yet 
politicians and policy makers focus most on the alleged ‘‘cost’’ of due process); see 
also Bagenstos, supra note 132. 
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opportunity to examine the interrelationship of 20 U.S.C. § 
1415(f)(3)(C) and § 1415(b)(6)(B), thanks to the G.L. court’s 
certification of the issue for interlocutory appeal.334  In ruling on these 
issues, the courts should reconcile the language of the provisions, the 
guiding principles set forth in the statute, the legislative history, and 
Third Circuit precedent. 
First, the courts should properly apply the two-year timeline for 
filing a complaint, set forth in § 1415(f)(3)(C), to the filing party’s 
KOSHK date in accordance with the language of the provision.  
Second, courts should read § 1415(b)(6) to mean that if an alleged 
denial of a FAPE both started and ended more than two years before 
the KOSHK date, and the court finds that the parent knew or should 
have known of the alleged action forming the basis of the complaint, 
then the claim is barred.  If the parent did not know (or should not 
have known) of the action, or if the claim occurred more than two 
years before the KOSHK date but was ongoing to the prior two years, 
then the claim should be considered in its entirety.  This 
interpretation is consistent with both the language of the IDEA and 
the legislative history.  Some may argue that this interpretation is 
simply an application of the continuing violations doctrine in disguise, 
and perhaps it is.  By the same token, the Third Circuit should not 
have eliminated this doctrine through its ban on the use of equitable 
tolling because, in so doing, the court contradicted the stated intent of 
the legislators. 
Third, the language of M.C. and Ridgewood determining the 
accrual of a compensatory education claim as the date the school 
district knew or should have known of the denial of a FAPE remains 
good law. It does not conflict with either the language of IDEA 2004 
or the Act’s legislative history.  As explained earlier, placement of the 
duty to identify the denial of a FAPE solely on school districts 
coincides with the Act’s requirement that school districts have the 
affirmative duty to identify, evaluate and provide a FAPE to eligible 
children.  The statute of limitations’ requirement that a parent or 
school district file a complaint within two years of the KOSHK date 
has no effect on the compensatory education accrual date.  In other 
words, while the statute of limitations applies to the timeframe for 
filing the complaint, it should not be applied to determine the starting 
point for measuring a compensatory education claim or to limit 
consideration of the scope of a claim as long as the claim is timely 
                                                                                                                 
 334. Order Including Certification Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), G.L. v. 
Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., No. 2:13-cv-00034, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180923 
(W.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2013), ECF No. 56. 
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filed.  The court should adhere to case precedent on this point, and 
cease its misapplication of the statute of limitations in compensatory 
education matters. 
CONCLUSION 
The Third Circuit’s dramatic shift in its approach to compensatory 
education claims has significantly restricted access to an essential 
remedy for children with disabilities in low-income households, and 
removed a critical deterrent for school districts to comply with the 
IDEA’s mandates.  The proposed recommendations ask Congress to 
follow the lessons of early Third Circuit precedent in amending the 
IDEA’s remedial scheme, and align with the articulated findings and 
purposes of the Act.  The plights of and poor outcomes for children 
with disabilities in low-income households coupled with principles of 
fundamental fairness dictate that Congress and the courts interpret 
and apply the remedy of compensatory education broadly while 
balancing the equities in applying a statute of limitations to such 
claims.  To do otherwise will serve only to perpetuate inequality for 
those living in poverty, and encourage school districts to hedge their 
bets in determining whether to provide a FAPE, to the detriment of 
too many voiceless children, their families, and society at large. 
